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Jurisdictional Statement

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(h).
Introduction

This appeal concerns whether Keith Smith is entitled to half of the
inheritance that his ex-wife, Sharon Smith, received from her mother, even
though the trial court found that the inheritance money was not marital
property. Keith admits that the family's trust document, the Smith Family Trust
("Family Trust"), which governs the ownership of the inheritance, gave Sharon
the inheritance as her separate property. But Keith asserts that once Sharon
deposited her $750,000 inheritance check into her own, separate bank account
instead of cashing it-assuming one can cash a check that large-the inheritance
that under the Family Trust was Sharon's separate property thereby became the
property of both Keith and Sharon. Keith's interpretation finds no support in the
plain language of the Family Trust, violates principles of contract interpretation,
and, if correct, would require the court to enforce an absurd result.
Apart from advancing a rather implausible interpretation of the Family
Trust, Keith fails to mention that after the trial court found that the inheritance
was not marital property and belonged to Sharon alone, the trial court awarded
Keith alimony based upon Sharon's ability to pay alimony, an ability she has
only because of the inheritance. Keith is therefore receiving part of the
inheritance anyway. For that reason, if this court reverses the trial court's finding
that the inheritance is marital property, it should vacate the alimony award.
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Statement of the Issues
Issue 1: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it determined

that the 2012 distribution of inheritance Sharon Smith received from her mother's
estate was her separate property.
Standard of Review: '"Trial courts have considerable discretion in

determining property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal
unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated."' Ston.ehocker v.

Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ,rs, 176 P.3d 476 (alteration omitted).
Conditional Cross-Appeal: If this court reverses the trial court's decision

below and instead holds that the 2012 distribution is marital property, then the
issue becomes whether to vacate an alimony award based upon Sharon's ability
to pay with the inheritance as her separate property where that ability no longer
exists.
Standard of Review: Where a trial court's basis for alimony no longer

exists, this court will consider the issue itself and reverse and remand for a
reconsideration of alimony. McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App 382, ,r16, 265
P.3d 839.
Determinative Provisions

The following provisions and cases are set forth at Addendum C:
Utah Code § 30-3-5

2
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Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

This case concerns the distribution of property and awarding of alimony in
a divorce case. For years, Sharon Smith received a trickle of money from her
mother. But in 2012, after her mother died, Sharon received a $750,000
distribution (" the 2012 distribution") from her mother's estate. She received this
in the form of a check, as she had received other money from her mother. Sharon
opened a new, separate account and deposited the inheritance check into it.
At trial, Keith asserted that he was entitled to half of the 2012 distribution,
not because he was entitled to half of the inheritance, but that he became entitled
to half of the 2012 distribution when Sharon deposited the check into her
separate account instead of cashing the check. Keith based his argument on his
reading of the Smith Family Trust documents ("Family Trust").
The trial court rejected Keith's arguments on two grounds. First, the court
found that the Family Trust declares that Sharon's inheritance is her separate
property and not part of the marital estate. Second, when dividing the marital
estate, the court found that it was most equitable to award Sharon her entire noncommingled inheritance. Thus, in the Decree of Divorce, entered March 26, 2015,
the trial court found that the 2012 distribution is not marital property.
But the trial court did award Keith alimony that Sharon must pay using
her inheritance. Sharon therefore conditionally cross-appeals the alimony award

if she no longer retains her full inheritance.

3
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2.

Statement of Facts

The critical facts concern the creation of the Smith Family Trust, described
below in section 2.2, and the distribution that Sharon received from her mother's
estate in 2012, described below in section 2.4. To provide this court with a more
complete understanding of the trial court's decision, Sharon also provides the
following information.
2.1

Background

Sharon Smith and Keith Smith married in 1979. (R.181:11.) They had five
children, who were born between 1980 and 1993. (R.181:11-12.) Finances were
always tight. (R.181:15,16.)
Sharon's mother had a significant amount of money from a family farm.
(R.181:19.) In 1978, before Sharon married Keith, Sharon's mother set up a
partnership to distribute her wealth to her children. (R.181:19.) The name of the
partnership was the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership. (R.181:20; Pet.
Ex. 1.) Sharon's mother transferred part of her interest to each of her children
every year while she was alive. (R.181:19.) In 1999, Sharon received
approximately $60,000. (R.181:52-53.) Sharon deposited that money in a joint
account and the parties used that money to pay their family expenses. (R.181:53.)
Sharon and Keith frequently had to accept money from Sharon's mother.
(R.181:14,18.) In 2002, when finances were extremely tight for Sharon and Keith,
Sharon's mother decided to give Sharon and her siblings each approximately
$3,000 to 5,000 of their inheritance on a monthly basis. (R.181:18,53.) Sharon's

4
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portion was deposited in a joint account and Sharon and Keith lived almost
exclusively on that money. (R.181:21-22,53-54.) Keith also began collecting Social
Security Disability Income. (R.181:25.)
Sharon and Keith had joint checking accounts, into which they deposited
distributions from the partnership and disability payments. (R.181:58.)
2.2

Sharon and Keith draft the Smith Family Trust

After a dispute over finances that almost ended in divorce in 2005, Sharon
and Keith hired a lawyer to draft a family trust document ("Family Trust").
(R.78-107;181:25,80 (attached at Addendum D).) The parties signed the Family
Trust on September 22, 2006. (R.103.) Keith thought a trust was a good idea
because it would shield the house and inheritance from bankruptcy. (R.181:26.)
Sharon testified that, when discussing the inheritance, Keith told Sharon that he
understood that the money was hers. (R.181:24-25, 89.) Keith testified that he did
not understand the meaning of the Family Trust. (R.181:80.)
The Family Trust creates The Smith Fao::i.ily Trust and divides it into two
~

separate trusts: the Keith L. Smith Trust ("KlS Trust"), and the Sharon L. Smith
Trust ("SLS Trust"). (R.78-107.) Attached to the Family Trust was "Schedule A,"
which listed the assets of the trust. (R.105-06; attached to Family Trust at
Addendum D and copied in full at Argument 1.1.) Subsection 2 states that the
Family Trust includes "[t]he following accounts in the following institutions,
together with all future additions, interest or accumulations therein and also
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including all new accounts and the accumulations and the future additions,
interest or accumulation in any and all other financial institutions in which new
accounts are opened in the future: ... [identifying specific bank accounts]."

(R.105.) Subsection 4 states that the SLS Trust retains "[a]ll right, title and interest
in and to the following: All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher
Family Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership." (R.106.)
2.3

The 2012 inheritance distribution

In January 2011, Sharon's mother died. (R.181:30.) At that time, Sharon
received approximately $10,000 from her mother's insurance and additional
money from the sale of her mother's house. (R.181:30-31.) Sharon and Keith lived
on that money. (R.181:31.) Beginning in about February 2012, Sharon and Keith
began living on different floors of the same house. (R.181:38.)

In October 2012, Sharon received a distribution from her mother's trust
("'2012 distribution"). (R.181:33.) She received a check in the mail for $750,000.
(R:181:7,8,32,33-34,119,147.) She opened two money market accounts in her own
name at Zion's Bank and deposited the check into them. (R.181:33-34.)
She testified that, in her understanding, cashing the check- i.e., walking
out of the bank with $750,000 in cash-was not an option, because "no one
would cash that big of a check. It had to be ... deposited." (R.181:34.)
She also testified that, in order to protect her 2012 distribution, she hired
an attorney to draft a new trust ("new trust") and then she placed the money

6
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from the 2012 distribution into accounts owned by the new trust. (R.181:35-6971.) She paid taxes and tithing and invested the remainder. (R.181:34,36,52.)
2.4

Separation and Divorce

In March 2013, Sharon and Keith separated their joint accounts. (R.181:37.)
After that, Keith did not help pay for the mortgage, utilities, or living expenses.
(R.181:38-39.) In October 2013, Sharon filed for divorce. (R.181:39.) In May 2014,
she moved out of the marital home but continued to pay its mortgage. (R.181:38,
42.) In August 2014, a court commissioner ordered Keith to start paying $200 per
month toward the mortgage but he did not do so. (R.181:43.)
In February 2015, the parties went to trial to resolve outstanding issues

related to the divorce, many of which are not at issue in this appeal. (R.138-139.)
Relevant here, Keith argued that he was entitled to half of Sharon's inheritance
and, if the court disagreed, that he needed alimony. (R.181:5-6.)
As to Sharon's inheritance, the trial court found that it was Sharon's
separate property for two separate reasons. (R. 65-66, Divorce Decree, attached at
~

Addendum A; 157-59, Findings of Fact, attached at Addendum B.) The trial court
found that under subsection 4 of the Family Trust's Schedule A, all distributions
belonged to Sharon alone, regardless of whether she placed them into a separate
"account," and that subsection 2 of Schedule A did not include the inheritance.
(R.158-59.) The trial court also determined that the inheritance was Sharon's
separate property under traditional Utah law regarding inheritance upon

7
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divorce. (R.158-59.) The trial court concluded that she had commingled the pre2012 distributions but not the 2012 distribution. The trial court therefore
concluded that the 2012 distribution was hers alone. (R.158-59.)
Finally, regarding alimony, Sharon testified that she still needed to work
six more quarters before she would be eligible for Social Security. (R.181:36.) At
that time, she will receive $162 per month. (R.181:36.) Other than his Social
Security Disability Income, Keith has no retirement income. (R.181:36,84.) The
trial court found that Keith had unmet needs and that Sharon could afford to
meet them with her inheritance. The trial court ordered Sharon to pay Keith $502
per month for 35 years, which is the length of the marriage, terminating upon
Keith's death, remarriage, or cohabitation. (R.160, 167.)
2.5

Keith's appeal

Keith appeals. He does not directly challenge the Divorce Decree. He also
does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that, under traditional rules
regarding inheritance upon divorce, the 2012 distribution is Sharon's separate
property. Instead, he challenges the trial court's interpretation of the Family
Trust. Specifically, he challenges the trial court's conclusion that the 2012
distribution remained Sharon's alone after she opened a new checking account
and deposited the 2012 distribution in it.

8
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Summary of the Argument

This appeal concerns whether a $750,000 inheritance that Sharon received
from her mother's estate ("2012 distribution") belongs to Sharon alone or is
marital property. The trial court found the 2012 distribution belonged to Sharon
alone because (i) the Family Trust unambiguously specifies that it belonged to
Sharon alone, and (ii) it was her separate property that she deposited into a
separate account and did not commingle with the marital estate. The Divorce
Decree states that the 2012 distribution is not marital property.
Keith does not challenge directly on appeal the Divorce Decree, which is
the operative document that divides the parties' property and declares that the
2012 distribution is not marital property. The trial court was within its discretion
when it found that the 2012 distribution was Sharon's separate property, and
Keith does not challenge directly that finding reflected in the Divorce Decree.
Instead, Keith takes an indirect approach. Keith asserts that, without
regard to principles that divide marital property, the trial court erred as a matter
~

of law when it interpreted the Family Trust. Under Keith's interpretation of the
Family Trust, he was entitled to half of the 2012 distribution when Sharon
deposited her $750,000 check from her mother's estate into her own separate
money market account.
The trial court rejected Keith's novel interpretation and found that the
Family Trust separated Sharon's interest in her mother's estate from all other

9
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11

accounts" owned by the parties, even after Sharon deposited her $750,000 check

into a new, separate account that she opened for that purpose. The trial court's
interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the Family Trust and the
intent of the settlors. Under that language, the 2012 distribution belongs to
II

Sharon alone. And under the language concerning accounts," only monies
deposited into the parties' established joint accounts became marital property.
The trial court correctly concluded that when Sharon deposited her separate
property into her separate account, it did not morph into marital property.
Keith's interpretation also leads to absurd results and renders a subsection
of the Family Trust meaningless. Under Keith's interpretation, had Sharon spent
the 2012 distribution or kept it under her mattress, Keith would not have been
II

entitled to any of it. But as long as she deposited it in an account," he was
entitled to half. Keith provides no explanation of why Sharon, or any reasonable
person, would have intended that result. There is no explanation.
Keith also fails to mention the alimony award. In awarding alimony to
Keith, the trial court determined that Sharon should use her inheritance to pay
alimony to Keith. The court awarded Keith $502 per month in alimony, for the
length of the marriage (35 years). Should that entire sum be paid out, Keith
would eventually receive (502 x 12 x 35)

= $210,840. In other words, by looking to

Sharon's separate property in setting the alimony award, the court effectively
awarded Keith an enormous portion of Sharon's net inheritance.

10
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Ci>

Argument
The trial court found that Sharon's 2012 distribution from her mother's
estate was her separate property, not marital property. Keith does not directly
attack that finding reflected in the Divorce Decree, but instead argues only that
the Family Trust signed by Keith and Sharon entitles him to half of Sharon's 2012
distribution after she deposited it into a separate "new account."
Examining the Family Trust alone, the trial court's finding was correct.
Keith's interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of the Family Trust,
with the settlors' intent, and with common sense. Keith's interpretation leads to
an absurd result, wherein Sharon's inheritance remains her separate property as
long as the $750,000 check is cashed, but somehow becomes marital property
once she deposits that cash into her own, separate bank account.
Keith appears to believe that the issue does not hinge on the trial court's
discretionary distribution of property, but instead hinges only on the
interpretation of the Family Trust. But even if the Family Trust were interpreted
as Keith argues, trial courts have discretion to make equitable orders regarding
I.@

the division of property, even in the face of an agreement by the parties. Utah
Code§ 30-3-5; Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472,476 (Utah 1975); Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT
App 26, ,r39, 321 P.3d 200. Keith has not challenged the trial court's property
division. If the court agrees with Sharon on this point, which is discussed in
detail in Argument 2, infra, there is no reason to read further, as this court may
affirm the trial court's finding on that ground alone.

11
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As described below, in addition to exercising its discretion to find that
Sharon's inheritance was her separate property, the trial court correctly
interpreted the Family Trust to reach the same result.

1.

The trial court's interpretation of the Family Trust was correct
Before considering the parties' arguments, it is necessary to understand the

structure of the Smith Family Trust (the "Family Trust"). The Family Trust is
divided into two trusts: the Keith L. Smith Trust ("KLS Trust"), and the Sharon L.
Smith Trust ("SLS Trust"). (R.78-107; attached at Addendum D.) The Family
Trust lays out the provisions that govern the trusts, including any additions, and
the attached Schedule A lists the property that was granted to the individual
trusts. Schedule A lists Sharon and Keith's assets and delineates whether the
property is being placed in the KLS Trust, the SLS Trust, or is to be shared
between the KLS & SLS trusts equally. (R.105-06, attached at Addendum D and
repeated in full below in Argument 1.2.1.)

In this appeal, subsections 2 and 4 of Schedule A, as well as Article II, are
relevant to whether Sharon's inheritance remained her separate property.
Subsection 2 refers to the parties' bank accounts. (R.105.) It states: "The
following accounts in the following institutions, together with all future
additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all new accounts
and the accumulations and the future additions, interest or accumulation in any
and all other financial institutions in which new accounts are opened in the

12
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future" and then lists only one account, a joint account at the Tooele Federal
Credit Union belonging to both the SLS and KLS Trust. (R.105.)
Subsection 4 refers to Sharon's interest in her mother's estate. (R.106.) It
11

states: All right, title and interest in and to the following:" and then states that
11

All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family Limited

Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership" belong to the SLS Trust. (R.106.)
Keith asserts that once Sharon received the 2012 distribution, described in
11

subsection 4 as deriving from the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership,"
and deposited it into "a new account" - but not the joint account listed in
subsection 2-the separate inheritance became marital property. The trial court
rejected Keith's argument, and instead found that the "interest" described in
subsection 4 did not lose its character when Sharon deposited the 2012
distribution into her separate bank account, opened expressly for that purpose.
In the Divorce Decree, attached at Addendum A, the trial court wrote that:
(9) As to the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, the
Partnership was an inheritance.
(10) All of the monies th[at] came from the partnership and
distributions out of the partnership, not including gifts from the
mother that came from her personal assets, were the Petitioner's
inheritance.
(11) In trying to reconcile Exhibit (Schedule) A to the Smith Family
Trust, the Court looked at number 4 on Exhibit (Schedule) A, which
states All right, title and interest in and to the following: All interest
of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family Limited
Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership."
II
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(12) All interest of Sharon L. Smith in the Luveda Fincher Family
Limited Parb.lership included distributions and they were simply
part of the partnership.
(13) The Court is interpreting number 4 of Exhibit (Schedule) A to
mean all the distributions belong to Petitioner.
(14) The language of number 2 of Exhibit (Schedule A) was for other
assets but did not include interest in the Luveda Fincher Family
Limited Parb.lership.
(R. 165-66.) Based upon these statements, the trial court found that /.([Sharon's]
interest in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Parb.lership is her separate
inheritance." (R.160; see also R.166.)
1.1

Under the language of the Family Trust as a whole, Sharon's
inheritance was assigned exclusively to the Sharon L. Smith Trust

Keith contends that, under subsection 2 of Schedule A of the Family Trust,
the 2012 distribution became marital property when Sharon deposited it into a
newly opened bank account. Keith's argument ignores the plain language of the
Family Trust and instead reads the language out of context.
To begin, it is necessary to view the Family Trust as a whole. Article II of
II

II

the Family Trust, called Additions to the Trust," controls how additional
property" was to be integrated into the two trusts set up under the Smith Family
11

Trust. Article II states that any new property acquired by any Trustee" 1
becomes part of the trust into which it is transferred.

1

The /.(Trustees" are defined in Article XXVII:
1. Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. Smith, Trustors, as Co-Trustees of The Smith
Family Trust.
2. Keith L. Smith, Grantor, as Trustee of The Keith L. Smith Trust.
3. Sharon L. Smith, Grantor, as Trustee of The Sharon L. Smith Trust. (R.97.)
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~

The most relevant parts of Article II are highlighted:
A.
It is understood that the Trustors or any other person may
grant and the Trustees may receive, as part of this Trust, additional
and re~l property by assignment, transfer, deed or other
conveyance, or by any other means, testamentary or inter vivos, for
inclusion in the Trust herein created.
B.
The Smith Family Trust shall be divided into two separate
Trusts, The Keith L. Smith Trust and the Sharon L. Smith Trust. Any
additional property received by the Trustee shall become a part of the Trust
into which it is transferred and sh.all become subject to the terms of this
Agreement. If such property is not specifically appointed to any
particular Trust, it shall be allocated equally between the Keith L.
Smith Trust and the Sharon L. Smith Trust, if both of the Trustors
are living, and otherwise to the Shelter Trust set forth therein.
Property held in the name of "THE SMITH FAMILY TRUST" shall
be allocated equally between the two Trusts and shall be subject to
the respective provisions in the next two sentences. Property held as
"THE KEITH L. SMITH TRUST" is the exclusive property of Keith
L. Smith, and Sharon L. Smith hereby expressly waives all interests,
including community property interests and separate property.
interests, therein. Property held as UTHE SHARON L. SMITH TRUST"
is the exclusive property of Sharon L. Smith, and Keith L. Smith hereby
expressly waives all interests, including community property interests and
separate property interests, therein .. ..
(R.78-79 (emphasis added.))
Additionally, Article VII of the Family Trust, entitled "Statement of
Intention," indicates that" all future real and personal properties acquired by the
Trustors are to be a part of, or to automatically become a part of, this Trust at the
time acquired by the Trustors." (R.81.) In other words, when Sharon, as the sole
trustor and trustee of the Sharon L. Smith Trust, received any new property,
Article II.B assigned it to Sharon and therefore to the Sharon L. Smith Trust.
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And as trustee of the Sharon L. Smith trust, Sharon had statutory authority
to "deposit trust money in an account in a regulated financial service
institution." Utah Code§ 75-7-814. Thus, if, under Article II, Sharon opted to
deposit that property into an account in her own name - as opposed to a joint
account- she did not thereby transfer the property into another trust, or make
the property marital. Moreover, as described below, Schedule A, which is simply
a list of the property that was to be transferred to the Smith Family Trust from
Keith and Sharon Smith, does not state that Sharon's property would become
joint when she deposited it into a newly created account. (R.78.)
1.1.1

Subsection 2 of Schedule A does not convert all new
accounts into marital property

Consistent with the above provisions, subsection 2 of Schedule A does not
by itself automatically convert any new account into marital property, nor was it
ever intended to do so. First, Schedule A is a list of the property that was to be
conveyed to the trusts created by the Family Trust and does not contain the
substantive governing provisions of the Family Trust. Second, Schedule A
assigns all property listed in its subsections to either the KLS Trust, the SLS
Trust, or the KLS & SLS Trusts equally. Finally, the language of Schedule A
subsection 2 does not automatically assign new accounts to both trusts.
Article I of the Family Trust states that Keith and Sharon "hereby transfer
and deliver to the Trustees and their successors the property listed in Schedule
'A', to have and to hold the same ... pursuant to any of the provisions hereof, ... for
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the uses and purposes and upon the terms and conditions herein set forth." (R.78
(emphasis added.)) Schedule A is a list of the property transferred to the newly
created trusts and is held pursuant to the provisions of the Family Trust, not
independent of them. The language of one subsection of a list of property cannot
be considered in absence of the controlling provisions of the Family Trust, as
Keith suggests. But even if the court were to interpret the language in Schedule A
in isolation, there is no support for Keith's interpretation of subsection 2.
For context, it is helpful to review Schedule A in its entirety:
KEITH L. SMITH and SHARON L. SMITH, Grantors, do hereby sell,
transfer, convey, quitclaim and assign for Ten Dollars ($10.00) and
other good and valuable consideration, all rights, title and interests
in the property set forth below to the Grantors as Trustees of THE
SMITH FAMILY TRUST, dated the 22 day of September, 2006,
Grantee. In addition, property listed under the ownership category
KLS is the exclusive property of THE KEITH L. SMITH TRUST,
property listed as SLS is the exclusive property of THE SHARON L.
SMITH TRUST, and property designated KLS & SLS is owned
equally by the two Trusts.
1.
All present and future interest of the Undersigned in the
following real estate, together with all present and future
improvements thereon, and all present and future water and water
rights thereunto belonging and also including all present and all
future personal property located thereon or wheresoever located:
Ownership
SlS

A.
Lot 12, Castagno Acres Subdivision, as described in the
plat maps and records on file at the County Recorder's Office,
Tooele County, State of Utah.
[Tax Parcel Number]
COUNTY OF TOOELE, STATE OF UTAH
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2.
The following accounts in the following institutions, together
with all future additions, interest or accumulations therein and also
including all new accounts and the accumulations and the future
additions, interest or accumulation in any and all other financial
institutions in which new accounts are opened in the future:
Ownership
KLS&SLS

A. Tooele Federal Credit Union
[Account Number]
[names of 4 accounts]

3.

Vehicles:

Ownership
KLS & SLS A. 2002 Chevrolet
[Vehicle Identification Number]
[Utah Title Number]
KLS & SLS B. 1990 Chevrolet
[Vehicle Identification Number]
[Utah Title Number]
4.

All right, title and interest in and to the following:

SLS A. All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher
Family Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership.

(R. l 05-06.)
The preamble to Schedule A states that all of the property listed can belong
either to The Keith L. Smith Trust, the Sharon L. Smith Trust, or both equally. It
does not state that future property would be subject to equal ownership and it
does not indicate preference for the division of new property.
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Keith relies on the latter part of subsection 2, which states that "and also
including all new accounts ... in any and all other financial institutions in which
new accounts are opened in the future." (R.105.) Keith argues that when Sharon
opened a new account in her name, that account became marital property. But in
fact, the language of subsection 2 that Keith cites does not say anything about
ownership or assignment of the named "new accounts," or, for that matter, any
account. It identifies that the Tooele Federal Credit Union accounts belong to
both the KLS & SlS Trust. That is the only mention of ownership in the
subsection. The critical language that Keith implies would assign equal
ownership to any new account does not exist.
As with everything else in Schedule A, ownership by one or both of the
trusts is assigned on an item by item basis, not categorically by subsection. Under
subsection 2, the one item listed happens to be held jointly by both trusts. This in
no way assigns, let alone reassigns, ownership in new accounts; it cannot be
interpreted to mean that any other account that might have been or may in the
future be listed under this subsection should also be under joint ownership.
To illustrate, compare subsections 1 and 2. Subsection 1 applies to real
property "and also including all present and all future personal property located
thereon or wheresoever located." The single item under this subsection is a piece
of real property assigned to the Sharon L. Smith Trust exclusively. Under Keith's
interpretation, subsection 1 would give the Sharon L. Smith Trust sole ownership
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of all future personal property acquired by either Sharon or Keith, wheresoever
that property may be located. If Keith's interpretation were correct, he would
never be able to own any personal property or any portion of personal property.

In contrast, as explained below, subsection 4 differs in structure and language,
indicating that the parties intended an automatic assignment of ownership.
1.1.2

Subsection 4 assigns sole ownership of the inheritance
distribution to Sharon

Keith does not contend that the 2012 distribution did not fall under
subsection 4 or that" all right, title and interest in and to" the inheritance was
owned by the SLS Trust. Nor does Keith challenge the court's conclusion that the
2012 distribution, when delivered to Sharon as a check, was part of "[Sharon's]
interest in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership." (R.160.) Instead,
Keith asserts that when Sharon deposited the check into an" account" - any
account-it lost its status as her "interest in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited
Partnership," as described in subsection 4, and became "a new account" under
subsection 2. (R.181:129-31; Op. Br. at 9.) Based on that assertion, Keith argues
that the distribution transformed from separate property to marital property.
This is contrary to the plain language of subsection 4, which reaffirms
Sharon as the sole owner of her inheritance. Subsection 4 unequivocally assigns
Sharon's inheritance to the Sharon L. Smith Trust exclusively.
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Subsection 4 reads:
4.

All right, title and interest in and to the following:

SLS A. All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher
Family Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership.
(R.106.)
Notably, subsection 4 reads differently than subsections 1 and 2: it assigns
Sharon's interest to the SLS Trust as a line item rather than as a category. Should
other "rights, titles, and interests" become available in the future, they are
currently unassigned. And indeed, the way subsection 4 is written sheds light on
how subsection 2 could have been written if it meant what Keith says it means. If
Keith were correct, subsection 2 would have had "all future accounts" as a
named line-item, not as an introductory paragraph to a list of line-item accounts.

In short, the language of the Family Trust as a whole indicates th~t any
new property received by Sharon is property of the SLS Trust, including her
interest in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, regardless of what
she does with it. But even were Keith's interpretation correct, however, his
argument still fails for the following reasons.
1.2

The trial court did not err as a matter of law when it interpreted
the Family Trust such that the 2012 distribution remained
Sharon's separate property

The trial court determined that "all distributions" from the Luveda Fincher
Family Limited Partnership were "simply part of the partnership," and "belong
to" Sharon. (R.160.)
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Keith argues that the trial court's interpretation of subsection 2 "to exclude
accounts where the funds originated from distributions from the Limited
Partnership ... was error." (Op. Br. at 7-8.) Keith asserts that, contrary to the trial
court's mterpretation, subsection 2 encompasses every single account that will
ever be opened by the parties, regardless of whether the money being deposited
mto that account came from a source specifically excluded by another portion of
the Family Trust. (Op. Br. at 7-8.) He also asserts that the trial court's "carve out"
of funds that originated m the Limited Partnership is mcorrect because "a correct
interpretation [of a trust] will harmonize and give effect to all of the provisions,
and not favor one over the other." (Op. Br. at 8.)
Keith asserts that it was the depositing offunds in.to an account that negates
subsection 4. According to Keith, if Sharon wanted to keep three-quarters of a
million dollars away from Keith, what she should have done was to "take the
distribution in cash, reinvest it, spend it, or anything else," but not deposit it in a
bank or brokerage "account." (Op. Br. at 9.) According to Keith, "once Sharon
placed it in a financial account, the account was joint property and half of the
account belonged to Keith." (Op. Br. at 9.)
"Issues concerning the meaning of trust terms [and] the legal effect of
those terms ... are all matters of trust construction." Dahl, 2015 UT 79, if 24. This
court should "employ familiar principles of contract interpretation when
construing trust instruments." Id. if 29. And when "harmoniz[ing] the provisions
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II

of a contract," this court examines the entire contract and all of its parts in
relation to each other and give[s] a reasonable construction of the contract as a
whole to determine the parties' intent. Also, when interpreting the plain
language, [this court] look[s] for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and
avoids rendering any provision meaningless." Nolin v. S & S Const., Inc., 2013 UT
App 94,

,r 13, 301 P.3d 1026.

Under established principles of contract interpretation, Keith's argument is
unpersuasive for the following reasons.
1.2.1

Keith's interpretation renders subsection 4 invalid
because it is impractical - or impossible - to make use of a
$750,000 check without at least temporarily depositing it
in an account

Keith admits that under his interpretation, "Sharon could take the
distribution in cash, reinvest it, spend it, or anything else," such as hide it under
her mattress. (Op. Br. at 9.) He does not explain whether or how any of those
actions would be possible without first depositing the check into an account. In
fact, Sharon testified that it is not possible to cash a $750,000 check without at
least temporarily depositing it in an account: "It has to - it had to be - no one
would cash that big of a check. It had to be ... deposited ... [i]nto a financial
account, yes." (R.181:34:13-23.) Keith has not challenged her testimony.
Keith says Sharon could have spent it, invested it, or hidden it, but if the
bank will not let her access it then in fact she cannot. In that event, her only
choices were to continue to hold the check, in which case it is actually worth
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nothing, or deposit it in a bank account, in which case Keith contends he is
entitled to half. In other words, because any effort to use the money requires the
use of an "account," there is no feasible way for Sharon to keep her inheritance
separation as described by subsection 4.
Without a realistic way to access the money without depositing it into an
account, Keith's interpretation renders subsection 4 effectively meaningless
because, practically speaking, there is no way for Sharon to use the money from
the Luveda Fincher Family Partnership without depositing it in an account.
Effectively, Keith argues that Sharon's inheritance is either useless or necessarily
joint property - in which case, subsection 4 serves no real utility. This court may
reject Keith's argument on that basis alone. When "harmoniz[ing] the provisions
II

of a contract," this court examines the entire contract and all of its parts in
relation to each other and give[s] a reasonable construction of the contract as a
whole to determine the parties' intent. Also, when interpreting the plain
language, [this court] look[s] for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and
avoids rendering any provision meaningless." Nolin, 2013 UT App 94, ,r 13.
Keith's interpretation also leads to an absurd result wherein, if Sharon
wishes to keep it separate from him, she can neither deposit nor cash her check.
Our appellate courts have frequently rejected proposed contract interpretations
that lead to absurd results. See, e.g. Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2013
UT 12, if 15, 322 P.3d 620 (rejecting contract interpretation that would lead to
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absurd results); Selvig v. Blockbuster Enters., LC, 2011 UT 39, if 28,266 P.3d 691
(same); Glenn v. Reese, 2009 UT 80, ,r15, 225 P.3d 185 (rejecting contract
interpretation that "would require a strained reading and judicial contortion
exceeding the bounds of reason" in favor of one that" does not produce absurd
or harsh results"); Okelberry v. West Daniels Land Ass'n, 2005 UT App 327, ,r24,
120 P.3d 34 (same).
1.2.2

Keith's interpretation improperly favors a general
provision over a specific provision, contrary to the rules
of trust construction

Even assuming that Keith was correct that any money received by the
parties at any time that is deposited into any account belongs equally to the SLS
& KLS Trust, and even assuming that Sharon could make use of the 2012

distribution check without depositing it in an account, the rules of construction
regarding trust interpretation demonstrate that the Family Trust keeps Sharon's
interest in her mother's estate separate regardless of what she does with it.
Like the rules of construction regarding statutes and contracts, the rules of
\;j

construction regarding trusts hold that "[g]eneral terms and provisions are
restricted by specific terms and provisions following them." 90 C.J.S. Trusts§ 208.
Given that fundamental rule, subsection 2-which is a more general provisionmust be construed with subsection 4- a more specific provision.
Keith's interpretation ignores this rule of construction. He states that "a
correct interpretation will harmonize and give effect to all of the provisions, and
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not favor one over the other." (Op. Br. at 8.) Then he states that "[t]he literal
language of [subsection 2] applies to all existing and future financial accounts of
any kind at any financial institution - period. There is no room in the language to
carve out the Brokerage Accounts. It was error for the Trial Court to interpret
such a carve-out into the provision - effectively rewriting it post hoc for Sharon's
benefit." (Op. Br. at 8.)
Keith's description of the court's interpretation as a "carve-out" is
intended to sound negative, but in fact, the interpretation that subsection 4 is a
"carve-out" is entirely consistent with the rules of construction that a general
provision regarding financial accounts must be restricted by the specific
provision regarding Sharon's interest in her inheritance. Because a specific
provision declares certain property to be separate, a more general provision
governing accounts does not operate to negate it. 2

In sum, under the canons of contract interpretation, the more general
subsection 2 is restricted by the more specific subsection 4 and the trial court was
correct in interpreting it this way.

This is not to say that there was no way for Sharon to share her inheritance with
Keith. She could have done various things to give him money. She could have,
for example, commingled it, which is described below in Argument 2. The trial
court determined that she had not. (R.159.)
2
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1.2.3

The trial court's interpretation is consistent with the
intent of the settlors

The trial court's interpretation is also consistent with the intent of the
settlors. Any analysis of trust language begins with a plain reading of the trust
document itself in order to "ascertain the intent of the settlor." Dahl, 2015 UT 79,

if 29. "The primary object of a court, in construing the provisions of a trust, is to
carry out the intent of the trustor or trustors." Hull v. Wilcock, 2012 UT App 223,

,rs, 285 P.3d 815 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Keith contends that Sharon's "interest" was her "bundle of rights," i.e.,
"the right to control the partnership, direct the use of its assets, obtain
information from the partnership, enjoy the tax benefits of losses and deductions,
and receive both cash and in-kind distributions, among other things," and those
things remain Sharon's alone because she did not deposit them in an account.

(Op. Br. at 9.)
But the sticks in the bundle of rights that Keith names- not including the
actual money-are not items that belong in a trust, nor are they items that could
~

be taken away from Sharon by anyone other than her mother. As explained in
the Restatement, "a trustee may hold in trust any interest in any type of
property." Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 40 (2003) (emphasis added). Similarly,

the Family Trust states that Schedule A lists the "property" of the parties,
including" any cash, securities, or other property," and notes that" additional
real and personal property" may be added. (R.78.) Schedule A refers to "all
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II

rights, title and interests in the property" named, and subsection 4 refers to all
right, title and interest" in Sharon's inheritance. (R.105-06 (emphases added).)
II

Keith's brief correctly states that a correct interpretation will harmonize
and give effect to all of the provisions, and not favor one over the other." (Op. Br.
at 8.) But a harmonious reading of the entire Family Trust indicates that only real
or personal property was intended to be in the Family Trust and that all real and
personal property acquired by the parties in the future would automatically be
part of the Family Trust, except for Sharon's inheritance. 3
1.3

Keith's argument is beside the point because Sharon created a new
trust that amended, modified, or revoked that crucial portion of
the Family Trust

In any event, even if Keith were correct on every point, the relevant part of
the Family Trust is no longer applicable. Sharon testified that after she received
the 2012 distribution, she created a new trust ("new trust") that currently holds
her inheritance. (R.181:35-36.) The Family Trust allows Sharon to revoke it and
11

create a new trust: As long as both of the Trustors are alive, each of them
reserves the right, without the consent or approval of the other, to amend,
modify or revoke their separate Trusts under this Agreement, in whole or in part,
including this Trust, concerning the property that each has contributed to the
Trust." (R.80.) When Sharon created her new trust, she revoked any part of the
Keith's argument is not revived by his noting that the impact of the accounts
provision" applied equally to both parties." (Op. Br. at 10, underlining in
original). Subsection 4 makes clear that the parties knew, and had always known,
that Sharon stood to inherit a large sum of money and that Keith did not.
3
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Family Trust that controlled her inheritance, thereby negating the provisions
Keith relies upon.
Revocation of the Family Trust by the creation of a new trust is also
allowable by statute: "Unless the terms of a trust expressly provide that the trust
is irrevocable," which the Family Trust does not, "the settlor may revoke or
amend the trust." Utah Code§ 75-7-605; see also Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, if if 31,
38, --- P.3d --- (describing husband's ability as settlor to revoke or amend trust in
accordance with the language of the trust); Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68,
iJif38-41, 266 P.3d 828 (describing settlor's ability under statute to amend trust);
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 63 cmt. k (2003) ("If a revocable trust has more
than one settlor, ... each settlor ... may revoke or amend the trust with regard to
that portion of the trust property attributable to the settlor's contribution.").
Moreover, even if she had not revoked the Family Trust, she still can. Thus,
even if Keith's interpretation of the Family Trust were correct, his argument is
beside the point.

2.

The trial court equitably divided the marital estate pursuant to
customary rules regarding dividing inheritance upon divorce

Throughout this brief, Sharon has pointed out that Keith has not directly
challenged the divorce decree's division of property. Keith has limited his
argument to a question of law regarding interpretation of a contract.
It is worth reiterating that, in fact, it is the divorce decree-and not the

Family Trust-that divides Sharon and Keith's property. In other words, which
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party has which property after the divorce was determined not by the Family
Trust but by the divorce decree, which Keith has not challenged. It is
unsurprising that Keith has not directly attacked the divorce decree because, as
described below, a trial court has discretion to distribute a marital estate and the
trial court's division here was well within its discretion according to Utah law
regarding the division of inheritance upon divorce.
When a court renders a divorce decree, "the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to ... property." Utah Code§ 30-3-5(1). "Trial courts
have considerable discretion in determining ... property distribution in divorce
cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion is demonstrated." Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ,rs, 176
P.3d 476 (internal quotation marks omitted). When deciding whether property is
separate or marital, the trial court "look[s] to a party's actions as a manifestation
of a spouse's intent to contribute separate property to the marital estate." Keyes v.

Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, ,r 28, 351 P.3d 90.
Generally, appellate courts "defer to a trial court's categorization and
equitable distribution of separate property due to the considerable discretion it
has in this area." Id. if 29.
2.1

The trial court was within its discretion when it divided the
parties' property such that Sharon retained her separate property

The legal framework for property division upon divorce is simple and
well-established. Before a trial court distributes marital assets, the court must
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first determine whether the disputed assets are marital or separate property. Dahl
11

v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 1121, --- P.3d ---. Marital property is ordinarily all property

acquired during marriage ... whenever obtained and from whatever source
derived," Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and it "is
ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing spouses." Stonehocker, 2008 UT
App 11, if 13.
By contrast, "separate property, which may include premarital assets,
inheritances, or similar assets, will be awarded to the acquiring spouse." Id. In
most cases, "equity requires that each party retain the separate property he or
she brought into the marriage, including any appreciation of the separate
property." Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1320. Said differently, "trial courts making
'equitable' property division pursuant to [Utah Code] section 30-3-5 should ...
generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during
the marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) to that spouse, together
with any appreciation or enhancement of its value." Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760
P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988).
There are, however, two ways in which separate property may lose its
separate character and thereby become subject to equitable division upon
11

divorce. First, separate property may lose its separate character if the other
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement,
maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable
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interest in it." Id. And second, separate property may lose its separate character if
"the property has been consumed or its identity lost through commingling or
exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to
the other spouse." Id. When making this assessment, the court "look[s] to a
party's actions as a manifestation of a spouse's intent to contribute separate
property to the marital estate." Dahl, 2015 UT 79, iJ143. Moreover, "[t]he question
of whether a gift or inheritance has remained separate is highly fact intensive
and the trial court is in the best position to weigh the evidence and make that
determination." Poll v. Poll, 2011 UT App 307, ,I6, 263 P.3d 534.
2.2

The trial court determined that the 2012 distribution was Sharon's
separate property

In its Findings of Fact, the trial court found that all of the money Sharon
had received from her mother was Sharon's inheritance and thus her separate
property:
(10) As to the ~uveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, the Court
believes that the Partnership was an inheritance. The way the Court
views it is that the Petitioner's mother helped the parties. The Court
believes that the help was appropriate, that there was a need there,
and that Petitioner's mother addressed that need.
(11) The court finds that all of the monies th[at] came from the
partnership and distributions out of the partnership, not including
gifts from the mother that came from her personal assets, were the
Petitioner's inheritance.
(R.157-58 (emphasis added).)
But although the trial court determined that "all of the monies that came
from the partnership ... were [Sharon's] inheritance," the trial court also held
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that certain of the funds had been commingled. (R.159.) Specifically, the trial
court found that the money Sharon received from her mother's estate before
2012, which she had deposited into joint accounts and that the family had lived

on, had been commingled and lost its separate quality, but that none of the
money received in the 2012 distribution was commingled. (R.159.) The court
wrote:
(16) The Court finds that in order to pay family expenses, Petitioner
used some proceeds until 2012 when the large amount came in. She

used those for the family to survive. The court finds those amounts
were commingled, but that she did not commingle the larger
payment of $750,000 that was distributed from the partnership, and
that remains as the Petitioner's sole and separate property.
(R.159.)
Keith has not challenged this factual finding. Nor could he because the
finding is supported by the evidence at trial and in the record: the 2012
distribution was deposited in a separate account Sharon created specifically for
that purpose and was not commingled. 4
The trial court's finding that an equitable division of marital property
leaves to Sharon the 2012 distribution stands unchallenged and, in any event,
well within its discretion. (R.159.)

The trial court did not address the question, but there was no evidence to
suggest that Keith had "by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an
equitable interest in" the 2012 distribution. Mortenson, 760 P.2d at 308.
4
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2.3

The trial court's conclusion is also consistent with policy
regarding Sharon's mother's intentions

Finally, it is worth noting that the trial court's conclusion is consistent with
Sharon's mother's intent that the money pass to Sharon. (Pet. Ex. 1.) Sharon's
mother's intent is important under Utah law. In Mortensen, the Utah Supreme
Court explained that the rules described above regarding inheritance upon
divorce "accord[] with the normal intent of donors or deceased persons that their

gifts and inheritances should be kept within their family and succession should
not be diverted because of divorce." 760 P.2d at 308-09. The trial court's
conclusion accords with Sharon's mother's intentions in her own trust.
Conclusion

This court should affirm the decision of the trial court because it correctly
determined that the Family Trust intended that Sharon's inheritance would
remain her separate property. If this court does not affirm, Sharon asks this court
to remand for a redetermination of alimony, as described in Sharon's conditional
cross-appeal below.
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Conditional Cross-Appeal
Statement of the Case

This conditional cross-appeal is limited only to the issue of alimony, and is
relevant only if this court reverses the trial court's finding that Sharon's
inheritance is not marital property. If this court concludes that the 2012
distribution was not Sharon's separate property, but was to be split between
Sharon and Keith, then both Keith's needs and Sharon's ability to pay would
change significantly. In fact, it may be, in that case, that Sharon is entitled to
alimony, rather than Keith. If this court disturbs the trial court's decision
regarding the 2012 distribution, this court should vacate the alimony award and
remand for the trial court to recalculate alimony.

Summary of Argument

The trial court ordered Sharon to pay Keith alimony in the amount of $502
per month on the basis that Keith had unmet needs and that, given her separate
~

inheritance, Sharon could afford to meet them. (R.159.) The award is for the
length of the marriage (35 years), terminating upon Keith's death, marriage, or
cohabitation. (R.167.) Should that entire sum be paid out, Keith would eventually
receive (502 x 12 x 35) = $210,840. Keith is not entitled to both half of Sharon's
inheritance and alimony that can only be paid through Sharon's inheritance.
Keith acknowledged this at trial, but does not mention it on appeal. (R.181:5-6.)
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Argument

In his appeal, Keith asserts that he is entitled to half of Sharon's separate
property as a lump sum. Keith fails to mention that the alimony payments are
connected to his not having received a portion of Sharon's separate property.
Alimony awards are predicated on three primary factors, known as the
Jones factors: (i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the
11

recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; and (iii) the ability of
the payor spouse to provide support." Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, if if 94-95, --- P.3d
---; Utah Code§ 30-3-5(8)(a).
The trial court considered Keith's needs ($1,700 / month) and ability to
meet his own needs through his social security payments ($1,198/month).
(R.166-67.) Given her minimal income, the trial court considered Sharon's
separate property in her ability to pay Keith alimony. (R.167.) Sharon's inability
to pay through any other means was supported by Sharon's Financial
Declaration. (R.41.) The trial court ordered Sharon to pay Keith $502 per month
in alimony. (R.167.)

If this court reverses the trial court's conclusion that Sharon's inheritance is
her separate property, it follows that Keith's needs and Sharon's ability to pay
would change significantly.

36

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Relief Sought

If this court determines that the trial court erred when it concluded that
Keith was not entitled to any of Sharon's inheritance, then this court should
remand for a recalculation of alimony. McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App
382, if16, 265 P.3d 839.
DATED this 4th day of March, 2016.
ZIMMERMAN JONES Boo

J · J. Nelso
Attorneys for Sharon Smith
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Certificate of Compliance With Rule 24(£)(1)

I here by certify that:
1.

This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App.

P. 24(£)(1) because this brief contains 9,011 words, excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(l)(B).
2.

This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App.

P. 27(b) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface
using Microsoft Word 2010 in 13 point Book Antiqua.
DATED this 4th day of March, 2016.
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Certificate of Service

This is to certify that on the 4th day of March, 2016, I caused two true and
correct copies of the Brief of Appellee to be served on the following via first class
mail, postage prepaid:
Michael D. Black
Parr Brown Gee & Loveless, P.C.
101 South 200 East, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Dated: March 26, 2015

06:36:54 PM

JAIME TOPHAM (11782)
LAW OFFICE OF JAIME TOPHAM, PLLC
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
291 NORTH RACE STREET
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-3426

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DECREE OF DIVORCE

SHARON SMITH
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 134300466

KEITH SMITH
Respondent.

Commissioner Michele Tack
Judge Robert W. Adkins

The parties came before the Honorable Judge Robert W. Adkins on
February 12, 2015 for trial on the issues concerning the parties' divorce action.
Sharon Smith was present with her attorney, Jaime Topham. Keith Smith was
present with his attorney Michael D. Black.
The Court heard testimony, received exhibits, heard argument, and having
found proper grounds and jurisdiction, and being fully advised in the premises. and
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby:

ORDERED,ADJUDGED,andDECREED
1. The parties are mutually granted a divorce a divorce from one another on the
grounds of irreconcilable differences, such to become final upon signature and
entry herein.
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PERSONAL PROPERTY
1. The court understands that both parties have emotional
attachments to items of their son,-• but the court will
leave the assets where they are presently. The painting shall
remain with Petitioner and the chest shall remain with
Respondent.
2. The remaining personal property is awarded to each party, as
they now possess it.

REAL PROPERTY
3. During the marriage the parties purchased a home together
,i

Ii

located at

!I
lj

4. The house shall be sold and the proceeds of the sale shall be

I!

divided as follows:

l'
I
i

a. First, the mortgage and the costs of the sale to include realtor and title company

/

I'

I,J
I

costs shall be paid before dividing any proceeds;

I

b. The remaining proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties with the
following caveats:
i.

I
I

The court is ordering that because the Respondent didn't pay the $200.00

I

III
I

per month under the Temporary Order, entered by the Court on

I

December 5, 2015, that there shall be deducted from his share of the
equity $200.00 per month starting September, 2014 and ending February

i
1:

i

,.
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2015, for a total of $1,200.00; and
ii.

Petitioner paid the full cost of the parties' two mediation
sessions in the amount of $1 125.00. The Respondent
1

shall pay half of the mediation expenses, in the amount of
$562.50, which shall be deducted from his share of the
equity.
iii.

Petitioner shall be awarded the amounts deducted from
Respondent's share of the equity as stated above.

;.
t.
,.•

r

5. The Respondent may continue to live in the home until it is
sold. If he chooses to remain in the home, Respondent shall
continue to pay $200.00 a month toward the mortgage as well
as all utilities associated with the home while living there.
Respondent shall pay the $200.00 to Petitioner each month.
The Respondent shall take good care of the home and shall
keep it in condition where it can be shown and in a condition

.·,

that is acceptable to the realtor that is selected by the parties.
6. The parties shall mutually agree upon the realtor selected to
sell the home and each shall cooperate to get the home sold
so that the equity can be taken out of the home and divided as
ordered in paragraph 4(b).
7. If there is a problem that develops and the realtor is of the
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opinion that the home is not being sold because it is being
lived it, the parties can address the issue with the Court by
providing the Court with the information from the realtor.
8. Petitioner's request for $5,328.00 in mortgage payments that

i
1·

she paid while Respondent was residing in the home shall not

~
i.
I',

be granted. Respondent is responsible for the $200.00 a
month to be paid toward the monthly mortgage payment as
previously ordered in paragraph 4(b)(i), but no further
recoupment is ordered.

INHERITANCE
9. As to the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, the
Partnership was an inheritance.
10.AII of the monies the came from the partnership and
distributions out of the partnership, not including gifts from the
mother that came from her personal assets, were the
Petitioner's inheritance.
11. In trying to reconcile Exhibit (Schedule) A to the Smith Family
Trust, the Court looked at number 4 on Exhibit (Schedule) A,
which states "All righ~ title and interest in and to the following:
All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family
Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limit~d Partnership."
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12.AII interest of Sharon L. Smith in the Luveda Fincher Family
:;,

Limited Partnership included distributions and they were
simply part of the partnership.
13. The Court is interpreting number 4 of Exhibit (Schedule) A to
1.'.

mean all the distributions belong to Petitioner.

~

;,
;,

14. The language of number 2 of Exhibit (Schedule A) was for
other assets but did not include interest in the Luveda Fincher
Family Limited Partnership.
15. In order to pay family expenses, Petitioner used some
proceeds until 2012 when the large amount came in. She used
those for the family to survive. Those amounts were
comingled, but Petitioner did not comingle the larger payment
of $750,000.00 that was distributed from the partnership, and
that remains as the Petitioner's sole and separate property.
16. Petitioner is entitled to funds in the Zions and LPL (formerly

i
I
!

Edward Jones) account and the accounts are the sole

ll

r··

!;

property of the Petitioner.

,

l--·

ALIMONY
t"'

17. Respondent has medical circumstances and receives Social
Security Disability in the amount of $1,198.00 per month as a

t".
i·'

(:

l

result of those circumstances.

I
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18. Respondent has unmet needs.
19. Petitioner's separate property is considered in determining the
unmet needs of Respondent.
20. Respondent's declaration has overstated his needs.
Therefore his needs are set at $1,700.00 per month.
21. Respondent's income is $1,198.00 per month and that his
unmet expenses are $1,700.00 per month leaving a need for
alimony in the amount of $502.00 per month.
22. Petitioner shall pay alimony to Respondent in the amount of
$502.00 per month, not to exceed the length of the marriage.
Alimony shall terminate upon death, remarriage, or
cohabitation by the Respondent.

ATTORNEY FEES
23. Each party shall pay their own attorney fees and costs
incurred in this action.

Approved as to Farm and Content:
/s/ Michael D. Black
Electronically signed by Jaime Topham with permission of Michael D. Black
Attorney for Respondent

END OF ORDER
In accordance with the Utah State District Court's Efiling Standard No. 4,
and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 10{e), this Order does not bear the
handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an electronic

March 26, 2015 06:36 PM
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signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order.
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JAIME TOPHAM (11782)
LAW OFFICE OF JAIME TOPHAM, PLLC
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
291 NORTH RACE STREET
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-3426
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

SHARON SMITH
Petitioner,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Case No. 134300466
KEITH SMITH
Respondent.

Commissioner Michele Tack
Judoe Robert W. Adkins

The parties came before the Honorable Judge Robert W. Adkins on
February 12, 2015 for trial on the issues concerning the parties' divorce action.
Sharon Smith was present with her attorney, Jaime Topham. Keith Smith was
present with his attorney Michael D. Black.
The Court heard testimony, received exhibits, heard argument, and having found
proper grounds and jurisdiction, and being fully advised in the premises, does hereby
enter the following:

'

I.

L

FINDINGS OF FACT

1:.-i

1. The parties have been actual and bona fide residents of Tooele County, Utah for at
least three months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action.
2. The parties were married on December 15, 1979, in Maricopa County, Arizona, are
husband and wife and maintained their marital domicile in Tooele County, Utah.
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3. There are irreconcilable differences existing as to both parties and both parties are
entitled to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable difference.

PERSONAL PROPERTY
1. The court understands that both parties have emotional
attachments to items of their son,-· but the court will
leave the assets where they are presently. The painting will
remain with Petitioner and the chest will remain with
Respondent.
2. The remaining personal property is awarded to each party, as
they now possess it.

REAL PROPERTY
3. During the marriage the parties purchased a home together
located at
4. The Court finds that the home was transferred to the Smith
Family Trust to protect the home from the Respondent's
potential liabilities. Respondent had been engaged in a
business which entailed a higher than normal degree of risk.
So the Court finds that the house was transferred to protect it
from potential liabilities, but that the house remained a marital
asset.
5. The house should be sold and the proceeds of the sale should

i
i.·
i-

i
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be divided as follows:
a. First, the mortgage and the costs of the sale to include realtor and title company
costs should be paid before dividing any proceeds;
b. The remaining proceeds will be divided equally between the parties with the
following caveats:

.!

.~

i. The court is ordering that because the Respondent didn't pay the $200.00
per month under the Temporary Order, entered by the Court on
December 5, 2015, that there will be deducted from his share of the
equity $200.00 per month starting September, 2014 and ending February
2015, for a total of $1,200.00; and

ii.

!_.

Petitioner paid the full cost of the parties' two mediation
sessions in the amount of $1,125.00. The Respondent
shall pay half of the mediation expenses, in the amount of
$562.50, which will be deducted from his share of the
equity.

iii.

Petitioner shall be awarded the amounts deducted from
Respondent's share of the equity as stated above.

!"

6. The Respondent may continue to live in the home until it is
sold. If he chooses to remain in the home, Respondent should
continue to pay $200.00 a month toward the mortgage as well
as all utilities associated with the home while living there.

March 26, 2015 06:36 PM

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3 of 8

0000156

---._-_.-_.-..-.-----·-· •----.-.-..-_.-.-..-.--~-.-~. -.--_-_L£E.L
.
______________---·-.-.-~~~-~~----~,-~.----.-...-..-..-..-.,-..-..-~t_,

~:~~~--:-~~

~

I

,.

b
f~

ji

Respondent should pay the $200.00 to Petitioner each month.
The Respondent should take good care of the home and
should keep it in condition where it can be shown and in a
condition that is acceptable to the realtor that is selected by
the parties.
7. The parties should mutually agree upon the realtor selected to
sell the home and each should cooperate to get the home sold
so that the equity can be taken out of the home and divided as
ordered in paragraph 8(b).
8. If there is a problem that develops and the realtor is of the
opinion that the home is not being sold because it is being
lived it, the parties can address the issue with the Court by
providing the Court with the information from the realtor.
9. Petitioner's request for $5,328.00 in mortgage payments that
she paid while Respondent was residing in the home will not
be granted. Respondent will be responsible for the $200.00 a
month to be paid toward the monthly mortgage payment as
previously ordered in paragraph 8{b)(i), but no further
recoupment will be ordered.

INHERITANCE
10. As to the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, the

March 26 1 2015 06:36 PM
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Court believes that the Partnership was an inheritance. The
way the Court views it is that the Petitioner's mother helped
the parties. The Court believes that the help was appropriate,
that there was a need there, and that Petitioner's mother
addressed that need.
11. The court finds that all of the monies the came from the
partnership and distributions out of the partnership, not
including gifts from the mother that came from her personal
assets, were the Petitioner's inheritance.
12. In trying to reconcile Exhibit (Schedule) A to the Smith Family
Trust, the Court looked at number 4 on Exhibit (Schedule} A,
which states "All right title and interest in and to the following:
All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family
Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership."
13. The court believes that all interest of Sharon L. Smith in the
Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership included
distributions and they were simply part of the partnership.
14. The Court is interpreting number 4 of Exhibit (Schedule) A to
mean all the distributions belong to Petitioner.
15. The court believes the language of number 2 of Exhibit
(Schedule A) was for other assets but did not include interest
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in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership.
16. The Court finds that in order to pay family expenses, Petitioner
used some proceeds until 2012 when the large amount came
in. She used those for the family to survive. The court finds
those amounts were comingled, but that she did not comingle
the larger payment of $750,000.00 that was distributed from

I

Ii

\'

!:

the partnership, and that remains as the Petitioner's sole and
separate property.
17. Petitioner is entitled to funds in the Zions and LPL (formerly
Edward Jones) account and the accounts are the sole
property of the Petitioner.
ALIMONY
18. The court understands the Respondent has medical
circumstances and that he receives Social Security Disability
in the amount of $1,198.00 per month as a result of those
circumstances.
19. The Court finds that the Respondent has unmet needs.
20. The Court finds that the Court, in this case, should look at
separate property of the Petitioner in looking at the unmet
needs of Respondent.
21. The Court, in calculating Respondent's unmet needs, finds

.,
;,

q
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that Respondent's declaration has overstated his needs, and
therefore sets his needs at $1,700.00 per month.
22. The Court finds that Respondent's income is $1,198.00 per
month and that his unmet expenses are $1,700.00 per month
leaving a need for alimony in the amount of $502.00 per
month.
23. The court finds that Petitioner should pay alimony to
Respondent in the amount of $502.00 per month, not to
exceed the length of the marriage. Alimony should terminate
upori death, marriage, or cohabitation by the Respondent.
ATTORNEY FEES

24. Each party should pay their own attorney fees and costs
incurred in this action.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court as set forth above.
2. The parties shoulq be granted a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences.
3. That the personal property should be awarded as set forth above.
4. That the real property should be distributed as set forth above.

t.:

5. That Petitioner's interest in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership is her
separate inheritance.
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6. That the Zions account and the LPL account should be awarded as set forth
above.
7. That Respondent has an unmet need for alimony and that alimony should be
awarded as set forth above.
8. That attorney fees should be discharged as set forth above.

Approved as to Farm and Content
/s/ Michael D. Black
Electronically signed by Jaime Topham with permission of Michael D. Black
Attorney for Respondent

END OF ORDER
In accordance with the Utah State District Court's Efiling Standard No. 4,
and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 10{e), this Order does not bear the
handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an electronic
signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order.
**1rir'll-k*******Hirlr**********rlr**'l1rlr*

March 26, 2015 06:36 PM
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§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care of... , UT ST§ 30-3-5

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
Proposed Legislation

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 30. Husband and Wife
Chapter 3. Divorce (Refs & Almos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 30-3-5
§ 30-3-5. Disposition ofproperty--Maintenance and health care of parties and
children--Dh,ision of debts--Court to have continuingjurisdiction--Custody and
parent-time--Determination of alimony--Nonmeritorious petition for modification

Currentness
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children,
property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:

(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses
of the dependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as copayments, co-insurance, and deductibles;

(b )(i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance
of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; and

(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health, hospital,
or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 which will take
effect if at any time a dependent child is covered by both parents' health, hospital, or dental insurance plans;

(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:

(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of
the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;

(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of
debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and

(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;

(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services; and

: . ::S::.. .::.·.·.,
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(e) if either party owns a life insurance policy or an annuity contract, an acknowledgment by the court that
the owner:

(i) has reviewed and updated, where appropriate, the list of beneficiaries;

(ii) has affim1ed that those listed as beneficiaries are in fact the intended beneficiaries after the divorce
becomes final; and

(iii) understands that if no changes are made to the policy or contract, the beneficiaries currently listed will
receive any funds paid by the insurance company under the tenns of the policy or contract.

(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all
or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the
dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to
provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.

(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.

(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and father after
entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.

(S)(a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other members of the
immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child.

(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an
order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace
officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter.

(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made and denied, the
court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action,
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.

(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent
or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs
incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation
or parent-time.

'td:$TLP"',\1
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(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:

(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;

(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;

(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;

(iv) the length of the marriage;

(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;

(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and

(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying
for education received by the payor spouse or enabling the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.

(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining whether to award alimony and the terms
thereof.

(c) "Fault" means any of the following wrongful conduct during the marriage that substantially contributed to
the breakup of the marriage relationship:

(i) engaging in sexual relations with a person other than the party's spouse;

(ii) knowingly and intentionally causing or attempting to cause physical harm to the other party or minor
children;

(iii) knowingly and intentionally causing the other party or minor children to reasonably fear life-threatening
harm; or

(iv) substantially undermining the financial stability of the other party or the minor children.

(d) The court may, when fault is at issue, close the proceedings and seal the court records.

( e) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the
-----••·••---·- .. -···-····--··-·•··••·- ····---····--·--·--·-····-----------··-··-······---·----··--·--··-•-··---······-~~-----·--·--'- ~ ~ ·: ~ .:_ .-..· @ 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage,
the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage.

(f) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties• respective standards of
living.

(g) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property
and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through
the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the
marital property and awarding alimony.

(h) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived
or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the
time of the marriage.

(i)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony
based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.

(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient
that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that
justify that action.

(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payormay not be considered, except
as provided in this Subsection (8).

(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.

(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's improper
conduct justifies that consideration.

(j) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed unless,
at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment
of alimony for a longer period of time.

(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the
remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony
is made a party to the action of annulment and the payor party's rights are determined.

···---····--·-··•·-··---------·---(,'E~l TL~·:.·
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(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party
paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.

Credits

Laws 1909, c. 109, § 4; Laws 1969, c. 72, § 3; Laws 1975, c. 81, § I; Laws 1979, c. I IO,§ I; Laws 1984, c. 13, § I;
Laws I 985, c. 72, § I; Laws 1985, c. 100, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 257, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 152, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 261,
§ 1; Laws 1994, c. 284, § I; Laws 1995, c. 330, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 232, § 4, eff. July 1, 1997;
Laws 1999, c. 168, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 277, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2001, c. 255, § 4, eff.
April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 176, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 129, § 1, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2010, c.
285, § I, eff. May 11, 2010; Laws 2013, c. 264, § 1, eff. May 14, 2013; Laws 2013, c. 373, § 1, eff. May 14, 2013.
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 1212; C.L. 1907, § 1212; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 1933, § 40-3-5; C. 1943, § 40-3-5.

Notes of Decisions ( 1483)
U.C.A. 1953 § 30-3-5, UT ST§ 30-3-5
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End of Document
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THE SMITH FAMILY TRUST
INCLUDING

THE KEITH L. SMITH TRUST AND
THE SHARON L. SMITH TRUST
:'

l_

/_:

jl

ARTICLE I
TRANSFER IN TRUST
For good and valuable consjderation, the Trustors, Keith L. Smith and Sharon L.
Smith, husband and wife, of Grantsville. State of Utah, hereby transfer and deliver to the
Trustees and their successors the property listed in Schedule 11A''. annexed hereto and
jncorporated herein by reference, to have and to hold the same, and any cash,
securities or other property which the Trustees may, pursuant to any of the provisions
hereof, at any tf me hereafter hold or acquire. all of such property being hereinafter
referred to collectivefy as the ''Trust Estate'\ for the uses and purposes and upon the
terms and conditions herein set forth.

ARTICLE II
ADDITIONS TO TRUST
A.
lt is understood that the Trustors or any other person may grant and the
Trustees may receive, as part of this Trust, additional real and personal property by
assignment, transfer, deed or other conveyance, or by any other means, testamentary
or inter vlvos, for inclusion in the Trus.t herein created.
B.
The Smith Family Trust shall be divided into two separate Trusts, The
Keith L. Sm.ith Trust and The Sharon L. Smith Trust. Any additional property received
by the Trustee shall become a part of the Trust into which it is transferred and shall
become subject to the terms of this Agreement. If such property is not specifically
appointed to any particular Trust, it shall be allocated equally between The Keith L.
Smith Trust and The Sharon L. Smith Trust, if both of the Trustors are living, and
otherwise to the Shelter Trust set forth herein. Property held in the name of "THE
SMITH FAMILY TRUST' shall be allocated equally between the two Trusts and shall be
subject to the respective provisions in the next two sentences. Property held as "THE
KEITH L. SMITH TRUST'' ls the exclusive property of Keith L. Smith, and Sharon L.
1
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I

I
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Smith hereby expressly waives all interests, including community property interests and
separate property interests, therein. Property held as lrfHE SHARON L. SMITH
TRUST" is the exclusive property of Sharon L. Smith, and Keith L. Smith hereby
expressly waives all interests, including community property interests and separate
property interests, therein.
.
C.
Unmatured life insurance policies transferred to the Trust at the death of
either of the Trustors shall be allocated to the Shelter Trust and shafl be under control of
the Trustees of that Trust, except if the insured is a Trustee of that Trust; then the
control shall rest solely in the Co-Trustee named or with the successor Trustees named
after the insured.

(
;.~
I

ARTICLE Ill
SIGNATURES

i·

The Truster, Keith Lance Smith, has signed his name and is known by his whole

i

name or by a portion thereof only or by a certain combination of names and the initials
thereof. The Truster, Sharon Lynn Smith , has signed her name and is known by her
whole name or by a portion thereof only or by certain combinations of names and initials
thereof, and also by the name of Mrs. Keith L. Smith, and a portion only of said name or

I

the initials thereof. Regardless of what combinations of the names and signatures of

!

the Trustors appear on past, present or future written documents, the names and
signatures of the Trustors, as written below, are intended by the Trustors and shall be
effective to transfer and convey the property listed in said written documents into this
Trust.

j

I

r--:-i

·'•
1

:,

·~·!

ARTICLE IV
GOVERNING LAW
The validity of this trust and the construction of its beneficial provisions shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Utah in force from time to time. Questions with
regard to the construction and administration of the trusts contained in this Agreement
shall be determined by reference to the laws of the State in which the trust is then
currently being administered.

2
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ARTICLEV
NO BOND REQUIRED

,-~

\ __/

No Trustee named_ herein need give bond in any Jurisdiction. If a fiduclary's bond
may not be dispensed with, the Trustors request that the bond be accepted without
surety and in the fowest possible amount In the absence of breach of trust, no Trustee
shaff ever be required to quaJify before, be appointed by, or account to any court, or
obtain the order or approval of any court in the exercise of any power or discretion
herein given.

ARTICLE VI
REVOCATION AND AMENDMENT

As long as both of the Trustors are alive, each of them reserves the right,
without the consent or approval of the other, to amend, modify or revoke their s·eparate
Trusts under this Agreement, in whole or in part, including this Tnist, concerning the
property that each has contributed to the Trust, in whole or in part, also including the
principal and the present or past undisbursed income from such principaJ. Such
revocation shall be by an instrument in writing signed by the Trustors and shall be
effective upon signing without notice to any successor Trustee. After the first of the
. Trustors has died, the survivor may amend or revoke only the Suivivor's Trust
provisions pertaining to the assets transferred therein by the surviving Truster, and may
not, however, amend or revoke the QTIP Marital Trust. The Shelter Trust shall continue
as an irrevocable Trust and will be administered and distributed as set forth herein. On
the death of the survivor of the Trustors, the remainder of ihe Trust Estate and the
Trusts created heretnafter shall become irrevocable.
B.
While any of these Trusts remain revocable, the Trustors may,_ in their
discretion, make such use of the funds or properties of these Trusts as they may deem
prudent, and such use shall be deemed to have been made with the consent and
approval of the Trustees as though a formal writing were submitted in accordance with
the provisions above.
C.
The interest of the beneficiaries is a present Interest which shall continue
until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death. As long as this Trust
subsists, the Trust properties and all rights and privileges thereunder shall be controlled
and exercised by the Trustees named herein.
A.

0

:•

j

r:·

C

~

i.
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ARTICLE VII

0

STATEMENT OF INTENTION

It is specifically the intention of the Trustors that all real and personal properties
now owned by the Trustors are to be a part of this Trust; provided further, that all future
real and personal properties acquired by the Trustors are to be a part of, or to
automatically become a part of, this Trust at the time acquired by the Trustors.
I

I

I

ARTICLE VIII
INEFFECTUAL PROVISIONS

lf any provision of this Trust Agreement is unenforceable, the remaining
provisions, nevertheless, shall be carried into effect.

t

ARTICLE IX
GENDER

In any provision of this Trust Agreement. the masculine includes the feminine
and vice versa, and the neuter includes the masculine or feminine and vice versa.
Where applicable, the singular includes the plural ~nd vice versa.

0

ARTICLEX

lt.

PERPETUITJES SAVJNGS CLAUSE

In any event, and anything to the contrary herein contained notw[thstanding. the
Trust created in this Agreement shall be subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities in
place in the jurisdiction governing this trust
In the event of the termination of this Trust as provided for herein, the Trustee

I:

shall distribute the Trust Estate as ft shall then be constituted, together with any net
income, to the beneficiaries then entitled to the income from the Trust Estate, in the
same proportions in which they are entitled to such Income.

ARTICLE XI
SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION
After any of the Trusts created herein becomes irrevocable, the interests of each
beneficiary in Income and principal shall be free from the control or interference of any
creditor of such beneficiary or the spouse of a married beneficiary, or the parent of a
chfld beneficiary, and shall not be subject to attachment or be subject to assignment
4
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either voluntarily or involuntarily. Each and every beneficiary under this Trust and the
various estates created hereunder is hereby restrained from and shall be without right1
power or authority to sell, transfer, assign. pledge, mortgage, hypothecate, alienate,
anticipate, bequeath or devise, or in any manner affect or impair his, her or their
beneficial right, title, Interest, claim and estate In and to either the income or principal of
any trust created hereunder, or to any part thereof, during the entire terms of said trusts;
nor shall the right, title, interest or estate of any beneficiary be subject to any right,
claim, .demand, lien or judgment of any creditor of any such beneficiary, nor be subject
nor liable to any process of law or equity, but all of the income and principal, except as
otheiwise provided in this Trust Agreement shall by the Trustee be payable and
deliverable to or for the benefit of only the named and designated beneficiaries. as set
forth in this trust agreement, and receipt by such beneficiaries shall relieve the Trustee
from responsibility for such good faith distributions. This spendthrift clause shall not be
construed to limit in any way the survivor of the Trustors' rights to Income or principal
under the Shelter Trust or the Marital Trust

ARTICLE

XII

· PARTIES DEALING WITH TRUSTEES

0

No purchaser and no issuer of any stock, bond or other instrument evidencin~t_a_.

deposit of money or property, or other person dealing with the Trustees hereunder with
respect to any property hereunder, as purchaser, lessee, party to a contract or (ease or
in any other capacity whatsoever, shall be under any obligation whatsoever to see to
the disbursing of money paid to the Trustees or to the due execution of this Trust in any
particular, but such persons shall be absolutely free in dealing with the Trustees on the
same basis as though the Trustees were the absolute owner of the said property,
without any conditions, restrictions or qualifications whatsoever.

ARTICLE XIII
DELEGATION OF AUTHORllY
When a Trustor is unable or unwilling to se1Ve as Trustee under this Trust
Agreement due to death, resignation or Incompetence. the remaining Trustor shall seive
as Trustee.
When the original Trustors are unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee under this
Trust Agreement due to death. resignation or incompetence, the successor Trustees in
5
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the order of succession set forth in Article XXVII shall serve as Trustees. For all
purposes of this Trust, each Trustee shall continue to be deemed mentally competent,
unless determined not to be competent by two physicians selected by the Co-Trustee or
the successor Trustee. The physicians shall not be liable for any determination made
as to the competency of the Trustee if the determination is made in a reasonable
manner.

ARTICLE XIV
POWER OF THE TRUSTEES
A.

0

i

I

i

~

Toe Trustees shall have full power to do everything in administering these

Trusts that they deem to be for the best interests of the beneficiaries (whether or not it
be authorized or appropriate for fiduciaries but for this broad grant of authority)
including, but not lirnlted to, the following:
1.
To buy. sell and trade in securities of any nature, including short
sales and on margin, and for such purposes may maintain and operate margin
accounts with brokers, and may pledge any securities held or purchased by them
with such brokers as securtty for loans and advances made to the Trustees, and
to acquire by purchase or otherwise and to retain, so long as they deem
advisable1 any kind of realty or personal property or undivided interests therein,
including common and preferred stocks. bonds or other unsecured obligations,
options, warrants, Interests in limited partnerships, investment trusts and
discretionary common trust funds, all without diversification as to kind or amount,

I

I
I

!

I
C

f
f
I
I

!

without being limited to investments authorized by law for the investment of trust
funds, and power to hold or take title to property tn the name of a nominee;
2.
To sell for cash or on credit, at private or public sale, exchange,
hypothecate, sell short or otherwise dispose of any real or personal property;
3.
To make distributions as authorized in this Trust Agreement,
including distributions to themselves as Trustees, in kind or in money or partly in
each, even if shares be composed differently. For such purposes, the valuatron
of the Trustees shall be given effect, if reasonably made;
4.
To withhold from distribution, in the Trustee's discretion, at the tlme
for distribution of any property fn this trust, without the payment of interest, all or
any part of the property, as long as the Trustee shall detennine In the Trustee's
discretion that such property may be subject to conflicting claims. to tax

6
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deficiencies, or to liabilities, contingent or otherwise, properly incurred in the
administration of the estate.
5.
If, in the Trustees' discretion, any beneficiary (whether a minor or of
Jegal age) is incapabre of making proper disposition of any sum of income or
principa1 that is payable or appointed to said beneficiary under the terms of this
Trust Agreement, the Trustees may apply said sum to or on behalf of the
beneficiary by any one or more of the following methods: by payments on behalf
of the beneficiary to anyone with whom the beneficiary resides, by payments in
discharge of the beneficiary's bills or debts, incfudlng bifls for premiums on any
insurance policies, or by paying an allowance to a beneficiary directly. The
foregoing payments shall be made without regard to other resources of the
beneficiary or the duty of any person to support the beneficiary and without the
intervention of any guardian or like fiduciary; provided, however, that the
Trustees shall insure and see to the application of the funds for the benefit of the
beneficiary, so that the funds will not be used by any adult person, or any other
person for a purpose other than the direct benefit of the beneficiary, and
particularly so that said funds will not be diverted from the purpose of support
and education of said beneficiary;
6.
To determine whether and to what extent receipts should be
deemed income or principal, whether or to what extent expenditures should be
charged against principal or income; and what other adjustments should be
made between principal and ~ncome, provided such adjustments do not conflict
with well-settled rules for the detennination of principal and Income questions;
7.
To deregate powers to agents including accountants 1 investment
counsel, appraisers, legal counsel, and other experts, remunerate them and pay
their expenses, to employ custodians of the trust assets, bookkeepers, clerks
and other assistants and pay them out of income or principal; ·
8.
To execute or enter into contracts, deeds, agreements or any other
documents of any nature whatsoever which the Trustees deem necessary or
desirable to carry out the provisions and purposes of the Trusts, to renew,
assign. alter, extend, compromise, ref ease, with or without consideration, or
submit to arbitration or litigation, obligations or claims held by or asserted against
the Trustors, the Trustees or the trust assets;
9.
To borrow money from others or from the Trustees. for the payment
of taxes, debts or expenses, or for any other purpose which, ln the opinion of the
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Trustees, will facilitate the adminlstration of these Trusts, and pledge or
mortgage property as security for any such loans, and if money is borrowed from
any Trustee (ndividually, to pay interest thereon at the then prevailing rate of
interest;

10.

To lend money to any person. including the probate estate of either

Truster, provided that any such loan shall be adequately secured and shall bear
a reasonable rate of interest
11.
To lease, or grant options to Jease. for periods to begin presently or
in the future, without regard to statutory restrictions or the probable duration of
any Trust, to erect or alter buildings or otherwise improve and manage property,
demolish buildings, make ordinary and extraordinary repairs, grant easements
and changes, make party wall contracts, dedicate roads, subdivide, adjust
boundary lines, partition and convey property or give money for equity of

i

i

Ij

partition;
12.

0

l

To operate, either solely or in conjunction with others, any business

I

I

operation or enterprise of any nature, whether it be an individual business,
general or limited partnership or corporation, for as long a time .and in such a
manner as the Trustees deem proper for the best interests of the Trust, with full
power to organize and/or operate as a soJe proprietorship or partnership, to
incorporate such business or to execute or join in any plan of refinancfng,

V

f~
ii

r

r
i

j·

merger, consolidation or reorganization thereof with full power to borrow monies
as the Trustees may deem advisable for the purposes thereof;
13. To charge to operating expenses all current costs of amortization,
obsolescence and depreciation of any properties of the Trust and to provide
adequate reserves for such amortization, obsolescence and depreciation;
14.
To effect and keep in force Jife, fire, rent, title, liability or casualty
insurance, or other insurance of any nature, in any form, and in any amount;
15.
To enter into transactions with any other trusts in which the
Trustors or the beneficiaries of this Trust Agreement, or any of them, have
beneficial interests 1 even though any trustee of such other trust is also a Trustee
under this Trust Agreement;
16.
To exercise all the foregoing powers alone or in conjunction with
others, even though any of the Trustees are personally interested in the property
that is involved, notwithstanding any rules of law. reJating to divided loyalty or
self~ealing;
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17. To invest in common trust funds, to hold and invest the funds of all
Trusts in solido without a physical division of the assets, as the Trustees in their
discretion may determfne.
18. To consolidate, for the purposes of unified administration on[y, the
assets of any trust created herein with the assets of any other trust created
herein, to the extent it declares the same to be the best interest of the respective
trust. Furthermore, there need be no physical segregation or division of the
various trusts, except segregation or division may be required by the termination

Q

of any of the trusts, but the Trustee shall keep separate accounts for the different
undivided Interests;
19. To take any action and to make any election, in the Trustee's
discretion, to minimize the tax liabilities of this trust and its beneficiaries and it
shall have the power to allocate the benefits among the various beneficiaries, or
between the income and principal accounts, to compensate for the
consequences of any tax eleqtion or any investment or to administrative decision
that the Trustee believes has had the effect of directly or indirectly preferring one
beneficiary or group of beneficiaries over others.
B.
Any Trustee may decHne to act or may resign as Trustee at any time by
delivering a written resignation to the beneficiaries of a Trust then subsisting.
C.
Any Trustee may1 from time to time, delegate to one or more of the
remaining Trustees any powers, duties or discretions. Every such delegation shall be a
writing delivered to the delegate or delegates and shall remain effective for the time
therein specified or until earlfer revocation by a further writing similarly delivered.
Everyone dealing with the Trustees shall be absolutely protected in relying upon the
certificate of any Trustee as to whom the Trustees are acting for and as to the extent of
their authority by reason of any delegation or otherwise.
D.
From the income of the Trusts hereby created or, if that be insufficient,
from the principal thereof, the Trustees shall pay and discharge all expenses incurred in
the administration of the Trusts.
E.
No successor Trustee shall be liable for any misfeasance of any prior
Trustee.

F.

The Trustee shall be prohibited from making any payments in
reimbursement to any governmental entity which may have incurred expenses for the
benefit of a beneficiary, and the Trustees shall not pay any obligation of a beneficiary
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which obligation is otherwise payable by any governmental entity or pursuant to any
governmental program of reimbursement or payment.

ARTICLE XV
COURT SUPERVISION NOT REQUIRED

All trusts created under this Agreement shall be administered free from the active
supervision of any court.
Any proceedings to seek judicial instructions or a judicial determination shall be
Initiated by the Trustee in the appropriate state court having original jurisdiction of those
matters relating to the construction and administration of trusts.

ARTICLE XVI

0

RENDITION OF ACCOUNTS
A
During the lifetime of the Trustors, the Trustee shall acoount only to the
Trustors and their written approval shall be final and conclusive in respect to
transactions disclosed in the account as to all beneficiaries of the trust, including unborn
and contingent beneficiaries. After the death of one of the Trustors, the Trustee shall, in
addition to any accounting required under applicable law, render an accounting, from
time to time, but not less frequently than annually, regarding the transactions of any
trust created in this instrument. Accountings shall also be rendered by any Trustee
within 30 days after his resignation or removal by a court of competent jurisdiction.
B.
Accountings shall be made by delivering a written accounting to each
beneficiary entitled to current income distributions or, If there are no current Income
beneficiaries, to each beneficiary entitled to any current distribution out of income or
principal, and each rematnderman in being. If any person entitled to receive an
accounting i~ a minor or is under a disability! the accounting shall be delivered to his
parents or the guardian of his person if he is a minor or to the guardian or conservator
of his person if he Is under any other disability. Unless any beneficiary including
parents, guardians or conservators of beneficiaries, shall deliver a written objection to
the Trustee within sixty (60) days after receipt of the Trustee's accounting, the account
shall be final and conclusive in respect to transactions disclosed in the accounting as to
all beneficiaries of the trust, including unborn and unascertalned beneficiaries. After
settlement of the accounting by agreement of the parties objecting to It, or by expiration
of the sixty (60) day period, the Trustee shall no longer be liable to any beneficiary of
1
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the trust, including unborn and unascertained beneficiaries, In respect to transactions
disclosed in the accounting, except for the Trustee's intentional wrongdoing or fraud.

ARTICLE XVII
CERTIFIED COPIES OF TRUST
To the same effect as if It were the original, any person or institution may rely
upon a copy certified by a Notary Public to be a true copy of this instrument and any
schedules or exhibits attached hereto. Any person or institution may rely upon any
statement of fact certified by anyone who appears from the original Trust, or a certified
copy thereof, to be a Trustee hereunder.

ARTICLE XVIII

DEATH
If either of the Trustors has a serious Illness or operation, the Trustors request
that the Trustees call J. RANDALL R(CHARDS, Attorney at Law, Salt Lake City, Utah,
to obtain instructions In case either of the Trustors should die. If death makes this prior
conversation impossible, then the Trustees should call said attorney as soon as

0

possible.

ARTICLE XIX
LOCATION OF DOCUMENTS

This Trust has been prepared in duplicate, each copy of which has been
executed as an original. One of these executed copies is In the possession of the
Trustors, and the other is deposited for safekeeping with J. RANDALL RICHARDS,
Attorney at Laws Salt Lake City, Utah. Either copy may be used as an original without
the other and. if only one copy of this Trust Agreement can be found. then it shall be
considered as the ortginal and the missing copy will be presumed inadvertently lost.
Clarifications or instructions concerning this Trust Agreement may be obtained by
calling said law firm.
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ARTICLE XX

0

PROVISIONS RELATING
TO POLICIES OF INSURANCE
In the event the Trustee is named the beneficiary under any policies of
insu ranee, said Trustee shall hold the same, subject to order of the owner of the policy,
without obligation other than the safekeeping of any policies which may be delivered to
the Trustee.

The owner of the policy retains all rights, options and privileges with respect to
said policies. Upon receiving possession of Insurance policies, proof of death of the
insured, or upon maturity of any policies prtor to the death of the insured, the trustee
shall use reasonable efforts to collect all sums payable on such policies for which the
Trust is designated a beneficiary or owner. All insurance se~lements as received by the
Trustee shall become principal of the Trust Estate, except interest paid by the insurer,
which shall be classed as Income. The Trustee may compromise, arbitrate or otherwise
adjust claims upon any of the policies. The receipt of the Trustee to the insurance
company shall be .a full discharge of the company.
The Trustee shall not be responsible for payment of any Insurance premiums or
any act or omission of the insured or the owner of the policy. The Trustee shall not be
required to prosecute any action, to collect any insurance or to defend any action
relating to any policy of insurance unless indemnified against costs and expenses,

~
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I
I

i

I

I

including attorney's fees.

ARTICLE XXI
DISPOSITION DURING JOINT
LIVES OF THE TRUSTORS

During 1he joint lives of the Trustors, the Trustees shall hold, manage, Invest and
reinvest the Trust Estate, and shall collect the income thereof and shall dispose of the
net income and principal as follows:
A.
(ncome. The Trustees shall pay to the Trustors all of the net Income of
this Trust, in monthly or.other convenient installments, but at least semi-annually.
8.
Principal. The Trustees may, In their discretion, pay or apply for the
benefit of the Trustors, in addition to the Income payments herein provided for, such
amounts of the principal of the Trust Estate, up to the whole thereof, as the Trustees
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may from time to time deem necessary or advisable for the use and benefit of the
Trustors.
C.

Incapacity. If, in a Trustee's soJe and absolute judgment, either of the

Trustors is so incapacitated by reason of illness, age, or other cause that he or she is
incapable of handling funds for his or her own use and benefit, or if unavailable to give
prompt attention to his or her financial affairs, the Trustee may use so much of the net
income and principal of the Trust Estate as the Trustee, in Trustee's sole and absolute
discretion, deems necessary or advisable, (1) for the comfortJ support, maintenance,
health and education of said incapacitated Trustor and any person who, in the judgment
of the Trustee, is dependent upon said incapacitated Trustor. (2) for the payment of
premiums on any insurance policies owned by said Incapacitated Trustor, whether or
not subject to the terms of this Trust Agreement, and (3) for the purpose of discharging
any debt or obligation incurred by said incapacitated Truster and believed by the
Trustee to be a valid debt including, but not Jimited to: home rental/mortgage payments,
utilities, installment obligations and established charitable contriqution customs.

ARTICLE XXII

0

DISPOSITION AFTER DEATH
OF THE FIRST OF THE TRUSTORS
A.
At the death of the first of the Trustors (and In case of simultaneous
deaths, this Trust will operate as if the wife had survived the husband), after payment of
currently due debts, expenses and costs of last illness and funeral out of the decedent's
Estate, the Trustees shall divide the Trust Estate into three separate Trusts, hereinafter
designated as the "Marital Trust", the "Shelter Trust" and the Survivor's Trust'',
respectively.
B.
The Marital Trust shall consist of a fractional proportion in all property of
the first of the Trustors to die that qualifies for the marital deduction determined as
follows:
1.
The numerator of such fractional proportion of the Trust Estate shall
be the smallest amount which, if allowed as a marital deduction, would result fn
the least possible federal estate tax being payable as a result of the Truster's
death, after allowing for the unified credit against federal estate tax and all
available credits and deductions claimed.
11
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The numerator shall be reduced by the value of any other property which
passes to the Trustor's spouse which qualifies for the marital deduction other
than the trust property.
2.
The denominator of this fraction shall be the value of the entire trust
property.. Values assigned to property for purposes of this computation shall be
those values finally determined for federal estate tax purposes. The Trustee
shall have the power to distribute assets, in cash or in kind, to the respective
Trusts and to select specific property to be distributed to the respective Trusts
without regard to the income tax basis of such property. In making these
allocations, the Trustee shall use the value of the assets as of the date or dates
of distrtbution, so that each distribution shares proportionately in the appreciation
or depreciation of assets between the date of the Trustor's death and the date or
dates of distribution. However, no allocation of assets shall be made to the
Marital Trust which do not qualify for the marital deduction. The Trustee shall
have the power to select specific property to be distributed to the Trusts without
regard to the income tax basis of such property. To the extent that other assets
whfch qualify for the marital deduction are available, there shall not be allocated
to the Marital Trust: (a) assets with respect to which an estate tax credit for
foreign taxes paid is allowable; (b} United States Treasury Bonds that are ellgible
for redemption at par value in payment of the federal estate tax. In computing
the marital deduction, all generation-skipping transfers for which the Trustor is
the "deemed transferor" shall be disregarded.
C.
The Marital Trust shall be h~ld by the Trustees separately in trust for the
following purposes:
1.
The Trustee shall collect the income on said Trust and pay or apply
for the surviving spouse the net income thereof, in quarterly or other convenient
installments (but at least annually), for and during the tenn of said surviving
spouse's life.
2.
Any remaining trust corpus shall be added at the death of the
surviving spouse to the Shelter Trust and shall be held and administered as a
part thereof; provided, however, that the Trustees shall first pay from the Marital
Trust the last illness and funeral expenses and any death taxes of the survivor of
the Trustors.
D.
The Survivor's Trust shall consist of the property which is the exclusive
ownership of the surviving spouse. such as said surviving spouse's interest in all
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community property and separate property belonging to said survivor or said suivivor's
Trust. Said Trust Estate Is under the fuU control of the surviving Truster and, if not
appointed otherwise, shall, upon the death of the surviving spouse, be distributed

0

pursuant to the provisions of the Shelter Trust.
E.
The Shetter Trust shall contain the balance of the Trust Estate remaining
after setting aside all property of the Trust Estate that is included in the Marital Trust
and Su,vivors Trust The Shelter Trust shall be subject to the payment of all the death
taxes of the first of the Trustors to die and shall be held by the Trustees separately in
trust for the foJlowing purposes:
1.
The Trustees may dis~ribute the income o~ the Shelter Trust among
the Issue of both of the Trustors as the suivivor of the Trustors may appoint.
2.
During the lifetime of the surviving Truster, the Trustees of the
Shelter Trust may distribute to said survivor such part or all of the net
unappointed income and principal of the Shelter Trust as said Trustee, in his sole
discretion, determines necessary or appropriate for the support and maintenance
of said survivor in the standard of livfng to which the surviving Truster is
accustomed, including reasonably adequate health, medical, dental, hospital,
nursing and invalidism expenses. The powers herein granted to the surviving
Trustor, while serving as a Trustee or Co-Trustee of this Trust Agreement, shall
be limited as follows: The suiviving Truster shall have no right to determine the
amount of any income or principal of the Shelter Trust to be retained or to be
distributed to said survivor or to distribute such but such determination and
distribution shall be made by the Trustee or Trustees serving with the surviving
Truster. If such survivor ls serving as sole Trustee of this Trust Agreement, then
said determination and distribution snalJ be made by the successor Trustee or
Trustees named immediately after the Trustors in this Trust Agreement.
3.
The suNiving Trustor shall have the unrestricted power at any time
to invade the principal of the Shelter Trust (nonmarital trust) annually, to the
e)Ctent of the greater of the following amounts: a} the sum of $5,000 or b) 5% of
the fair market value of the property of the Shelter Trust determined by the
Trustee as of the end of the month immediately preceding the request This
power shall be noncumulative and the power with respect to each year shall, if
not exercised, lapse on the last day of each calendar year the power is held. The
exercising of this power shall be made in writing by said surviving Truster to the
Trustee.
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4.
Upon the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trustees shall dispose
of the unappo[nted remaining principal and income of the Shelter Trust as
directed in Article XXHI.
F.
Statutory interests, if any, of the survivor of the Trustors, in his or her
spouse's real and personal property, is hereby expressly waived by both of the Trustors.
G.
lf this Trust is named beneficiary under any retirement plan, then such
amounts so received shall be held pursuant to the provisions of Article XXII, paragraph
E, provided further, that no federal estate nor state Inheritance taxes nor any debts or
liabilities of the deceased Truster/plan participant may be paid from such proceeds.
H.
Jf the Trustors or any primary and secondary beneficiary die
slmuJtaneously or under such conditions that it cannot be determined from credible
evidence which of them was the first to die, the provisions made herein for the surviving
spouse shaJl be construed as though 1he Trustor-wife survived the Truster-husband.
My secondary beneficiary shall be deemed to have predeceased the primary
beneficiary.

ARTICLEXXHI
DISPOSITION ON DEATH OF

0

THE SURVIVING TRUSTOR
All Trust princlpal1 with all accumulated income thereof, directed to be disposed
of under the provisions herein. shall, upon the death of the survivor of the Trustors 1 be
held in Trust for the benefit of the following beneficiaries of the Trustors and shall be
disposed of as follows:
A.
An amount determined by the Trustees1 in their sole dfscretion, shall be
set aside from the balance of the funds held in Trust and shall be used for the support
maintenance, health insurance or to meet the costs of any illness or accfdent and
education of the beneficiaries of this Trust as determined by Article XXlll paragraph c,
who have not reached age 21 prior to the death of the survivor of the Trustors.
Education of the beneficiaries shall include, but not be limited to, musical education 1
dancing lessons, grammar school, secondary school 1 college, graduate school, trade
school1 private school and vocational training schooJ.
In determining the amount to be set aside under the provisions of this paragraph
and the amounts to be paid therefrom, the Trustees shall take into account the needs,
ages, assets and other available sources of Income and support of the beneficiaries,
including each beneficiarys ability to contribute to his or her own support The Trustees
1

1

,0

16

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0000093

l~ i>

11

------- =--=~~~~---~--~-~~~~~~--~,=--~,

: - = .~ " " ' . " " ' _____
-

:_(-_1

shall determine the amounts to be distributed, the beneficiary or beneficiaries to whom

0

distributions are to be made, and the time and manner of distributions made under this
paragraph and shall distribute according to the various needs of the beneficiaries, even
if such distributions are unequal. After the youngest beneficiary described in paragraph

B herein has attained age 21, the balance, if any, of the amounts set aside under this
paragraph shall be distributed according to Article XXIII, paragraph C.
B.

In the e v e n t - Smith is under 18 years of age, the Trustees shall

set aside in Trust the real property last used as the·principal residence of the Trustors,
for the benefit o f - until such time as she attains 18 years of age. The Trustees
shall also set aside a sufficient amount of money to pay all expenses related to the
upkeep of the principal residence. When turns 18, the Trustees shall distribute
the principal residence according to the provisions set forth in paragraph r:c 11 below.

C.

Mer setting aside sufficient amounts to carry out the purposes of Article

XXIII, paragraph A, above, the Trustees shall divide the Trust Estate into as many equal
shares as there are children of the Trustors then living and children of the Trustors then
deceased but leaving surviving issue; provided further, that each of said shares, if not
immediately distributed, shall constitute and be held, administered and distributed by

the Trustees as a separate Trust, as follows:
1.
One such share shall be set aside for the benefit of each of the
children of the Trustors who may then be living and, if held in Trust, shall
constitute the Trust Estate of such child's Trust
2.
One such equal shar.e of the Trust Estate shall be set aside for the
benefit of the suiviving fssue, by right of representation, of each of the children of
the Trustors who may then be deceased but leave issue surviving and, if held in
Trust, shall constitute the Trust Estate of such issue's Trust; the amounts so set
aside may be used for the purposes and benefits as enumerated in Article XXIII,
paragraph A, above.
3.
As each above-described beneficiary attains age 21, the share of
the Trust Estate for said beneficiary shall be dfstributed to him or her free and
clear of Trust, upon his or her request therefore, as follows: 1/3 of the Trust
Estate shall be distributed to each beneficiary when he or she has atta(ned the
age of 21; 1/2 of the remafnfng balance of the Trust Estate shall be distnbuted to
each beneficiary when he or she has attained the age of 25; and the remaining
balance shall be distributed to each beneficiary upon attaining age 30.

0
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Whenever used herein, the terms "issue111 "child", "childrenn and

"descendants'' include adopted (ssue, adopted child, adopted children and adopted

descendants, as well as natural issue, natural child, natural children and natural
descendants, and include descendants of adopted issue, adopted ch[ld, adopted
children and adopted descendants.
E. ·

If any of the above beneficiaries are unable or unwilling to take any portion

of the Trust Estate, then the Trustees shall distribute the portion of the property of that
beneficiary to his or her issue by right of representation and, If none, then to the other
Trust beneficiaries proportionate to each beneficiary's interest in the Trust and, if no
remaining beneficiaries, then: one-half to the llvlng heirs at law of the first of the
Trustors to die and one-half to the living heirs at law of the las~ of the Trustors to die;
provided further, that said heirs at law of each of the_ Trustors shall take the Trust
property in the same priority and in the same distributive order as listed in the law of
intestate succession of the state referred to in Article I as in force on the date of the
signing of this Trust Agreement.

ARTICLE XXIV
ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST UPON THE DEATH OF A TRUSTOR

0

On the death of a Truster, the Trustee is authorized, but not directed to

A

pay the following:
1.

2.

Expenses of the last illness, funeral and burial of such Trustor.

Legally enforceable claims against such Truster or such of Truster's

estate.

3.
Expenses with regard to the administration of such Truster's estate.
4.
Federal estate tax, applicable state inheritance or estate taxes, or
any other taxes occasioned by the death of such Trusler.
5.
Statutory or court ordered allowances for qualifying family
members.

6.
The payments authorized under this Article are discretionary and
no claims or right to payment by third parties may be enforced against the trust
by virtue of such discretionary authority.
7.
The Trustee shall be indemnified from the trust property for any
damages sustained by tJ:'le Trustee as a result of the Trustee exercising, in good
faith, the authority granted the Trustee under this Article.
7

c,
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B.
If the Trust created herein holds United States Treasury Bonds which are
eligible for redemption at par in payment of the federal estate tax, the Trustee shall
redeem such bonds to the extent necessary to pay federal estate tax as a result of such
Trustor's death.
C.

This paragraph shall be utilized to help facilitate the coordination between

the personal representative of a Trustors probate estate and the Trustee with respect to
any property owned by the Trustors outside of this Trust Agreement on such Truster's
death.
1.
The Trustee, in the Trustee•s sole and absolute discretion, may
elect to pay the payments authorized under this Article either directly to the
appropriate persons or Institutions or to the personal representative of such
Trustors probate estate.
The Trustee may rely upon the written statements of such Truster's

personal representative as to all material facts relating to these payments; the
Trustee shall not have any-duty to see to the application of such payments.
2.
The Trustee is authorized to purchase and retain in the form
received, as an addition to the Trust, any property which is a part of such·

0

Trustors probate estate. In addition, the Trustee may make Joans1 with or
without security. to such Trustors probate estate. The Trustee shall not be liable
for any los~ suffered by any Trust created herein as a result of the exercise of the
powers granted in this paragraph.
3.
The Trustee Is authorized to accept distributions from the personal
representative of an Truster's probate estate without audit and the Trustee shall
be under no obligation to examine the records or accounts of the persona]
representative of such Trustors probate estate.

ARTICLEXXV
TRUSTEE'S AUTHORITY TO MAKE TAX ELECTIONS

The Trustee may exercise any available elections with regard to state or federal
income, inheritance, estate, succession, or gift tax law.
A.
Alternate Valuation Date. The authority granted the Trustee in this Article
includes the right to elect any alternate valuation date for federal estate, state estate or
inheritance tax purposes.
B.
Tax and Reh.Jms. The Trustee may also:
1.
Sign joint tax returns.
19
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C.

2.

Pay any taxes, interest or penalties with regard to taxes.

3.

Apply for and collect tax refunds and interest thereon.

All expenses, taxes and claims shall be paid without apportionment, and

without reimbursement from any person.

ARTICLE XXVI
PERSONAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTIONS
All personal properties listed on the Personal Property List are to be distributed to
the named designees and such items shall be conveyed to such persons in addition to
their respective distributive shares of the Trust described herein.

ARTICLE XXVII
TRUSTEES AND FAMILY MEMBERS

A.

0

8.

The present living children of the Trustors and their birth dates are:

•

I

-Smith.
-Smith

,1980
_ , 1985

I,

-Smith-

-1988

i'

-..Smith

- • 1993

h

I'

I

The following people shall serve as Trustees:

1.

-

• Smith a n d -

•

I

Smith, Trustors, as Co-Trustees of

I

The Smith Family Trust.

•
•

2.
3.
4.

-

5.

When neither Granter is able or willing to serve as Trustee, the

Smith, Grantor, as Trustee of T h e - · Smith Trust.

Smith, Grantor, as Trustee of The Smith Trust.
When a Grantor is unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee, the

remaining Granter shall serve as Trustee.

I
I.

following persons are appointed as Trustees in the following order
of succession:

a.

- S m i t h.

b.

-Swenson.

c.

A Trustee chosen by a majority of beneficiaries, with a

•l'.

r

[

parent or legal guardian voting for minor beneficiaries.
C.

t

Whenever more than one Trustee is designated to act concurrently, a

majority of the Trustees, whether individual or corporate, shall have the power to make

i
I
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0

any decision, undertake any action, or execute any documents affecting the Trusts
created herein. In the event of a difference of opinion among the Trustees, the decision
of a majority of them shall prevail, but the dissenting or nonassenting Trustees shall not
be responsible for any action taken by the majprity pursuant to ~uch d~cision. After the
death of the first of the Trustors to die, if only two indfvldual Trustees are in office, they
must act unanimously. If an individual and a corporate Trustee are in office, the
determination of the individual Trustee shall be binding.
D.
Each Successor Trustee shall have the same duties and powers as are
assumed in this Trust Agreement.
E.
No successor Trustee shall be liable for any act, omission, or default of a
predecessor Trustee. Unless requested in writing within sixty (60) days of appointment
by an adult beneficiary of the trust, no successor Trustee shall have any duty to
investigate or review any action of a predecessor Trustee and may accept the
accounting records of the predecessor Trustee showing assets on hand without further
investigation and without incuning any liability to any person clafmf ng or having an
interest in the trust.

ARTICLE

0

0

--··

xxvm

SPECIAL TRUSTEE PROVISIONS

As used throughout this Agreement, the word Trustee shall refer to the
original Trustee as well as any single, additional, or successor Trustee. It shall also
refer to any individual, corporation or other entity acting as a replacement, substitute, or
added Trustee,
8.
After the death of the first of the Trustors, the surviving Trustor shall have
the right, from time-to--time, to discharge any Trustee or Successor Trustee of any trust
hereunder and to appoint a successor as Trustee fn its place. Upon the death of the
surviving Trustor, the unanimous consent of the then Beneficiaries of all Trusts then
established shall be sufficient to discharge any Trustee or Co-Trustee and appoint a
successor Trustee or Co-Trustee. Discharge of a Trustee shall be by delivering to such
Trustee thirty (30) days notice of discharge accompanied by the name of the intended
Successor Trustee. The Trustee of any trust hereunder, including any Successor
Trustee, may resign by delivery of ninety (90) days• written notlce of resignation to au of
the then income beneficiaries of such trust. In the event of such resignation, such
Income beneficiaries who are adults shall have the right to appofnt a Successor Trustee
In its place; provided, that if no such income beneficiary is an adult, then such
A.
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appointment shall be made by the parent or legal guardian of such incorne beneficiary;
provided further, that in the event of dispute among such income benefictartes, their
parents or their guardians, the majority shall prevail.
C.
As long as any individual narne.d in this instrument s~all serve as CoTrustee of these trusts, that individual shall have the power from time-to-time to
delegate to the other Co-Trustee all or any of his powers as Co-Trustee during
temporary vacation periods or other temporary periods. The power of delegation shall
be exercised by delivery by the individual Co-Trustee to the other Co-Trustee of written
notice specifying the powers delegated; this delegation shall terminate on delivery by
the Individual Co-Trustee to the other Co-Trustee of written notice of tenninatlon of
delegation. The individual Co-Trustee shall incur no liability to any beneficiary of the
Trust Estate as a result of any action taken or not taken within the scope of delegation

<iJ

I

I

during the period of delegation.
The Original Trustee or Co-Trustees shall receive no compensation for
ordinary services performed hereunder. The Successor Trustee or Trustees, whether
corporate or noncorporate, shall be entitled to receive reasonable compensation.for
services rendered by them or counsel retained by them 1 including seivices in
connection with the transfer of assets to beneficiaries or successor Trustees and the
appointment of successor Trustees. Reasonable compensation shall be based upon
the then prevailing rates charged for similar services in the locality where the same are
performed by other fiduciaries engaged in.the trust business or acting as Trustees.
E.
The Trustee may abandon any real or personal property whf ch may be
determined to be worthless; any such determination by the Trustee shall be binding
upon all parties interested hereunder.
F.
If an individual Co-Trustee rs unable to participate in trust activities

o.

0

because of illness, disability, or any other reason, the remainin~ Trustee may, during
any such incapacity, make any and all decisions regarding the Trust Estate as though it
were the sole Trustee. In determfnfng the dfsability of the Individual Trustee, the
remaining Trustee may rely on a certificate or other written statement from two licensed
physicians who have examined the individu·a1 Trustee. In the absence of such a
certificate or statement, the remaining Trustee shall petition the court having jurisdiction
over this trust for authority to proceed as sole Trustee; under authority of this paragraph.
Toe remaining Trustee shatl incur no liabiUty to any beneficiary of the trust or to the
individual Trustee as a result of any action taken under this paragraph.

0
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This trust is created upon the express understanding that the Issuer
(Including transfer agents) or custodfan of any shares of stock or mutual funds shall be
under no liability whatsoever to see to ifs proper administration; and that upon the
transfer of the right, title and interest in and to said shares by any Trustee hereunder,
said issuer or custodian shall conclusively treat the transferee as the sole owner of said
shares. In the even_t that any shares, cash, or other property shall be distributable at
any time under the terms of said shares, the said issuer or custodian is fully authorized
to pay, deliver and distribute the same to whosoever shall then be Trustee hereunder,
and shall be under no liabillty to see the proper application thereof. The issuer or
custodian is authorized to make such distributions under a mutual fund systematic
withdrawal plan as have been specified by any Trustee acting hereunder. Until the
issuer or custodian shall receive from some person Interested in this trust written notice
of any death or other event upon with the right to receive may depend, the issuer or
custodian shall incur no liability for payments made in good faith to persons whose

~

,.

interests shall have been affected by such event. The issuer or custodian shall be
protected in acting upon any notice or other instrument or document believed by it to be
genuine and to have been signed or presented by the property party or parties. The
Trustee shall have the right to pledge the shares as collateral for any loans made to the

0

trust or to any Trustors.
H. During the lifetime of the Trustors, they shall have the power in their
discretion, to direct that the Trustee employ a reputable professional investment counsel
of their choice, provided that the investment counsel ~hall currently be handling at least
five other accounts of similar size. Any Investment counsel designated by the Tru·stors
or either of them shall cqntinue to be retained in that capacity after the death of the
survivor of the Trustors. In the absence of compelling circumstances to the contrary or
except as provided below. On the death or legal disabnity of the surviving Truster, each
child of the Trustors who has attained the age of 25 shall have the power, in his

~~

discretion, to direct that the Trustee employ a reputable professional _investment counsel
of his choice (provided that the investment counsel shall currently be handling at least
five other accounts of similar size) to supervise the investment of the trust set aside for

CJ)

~

that child and hfs issue.
The Trustee shall ab(de by the decision of the independent counsel with
respect to property placed under his control, but shall not be held Uable or otherwise
surcharged for losses directly attributable to investments made on the advice of the
independent counsel. During the period that independent counsel Is retained by the

0

,.·

1~

h
t:C

r~

/0

r!
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Trustee, the Trustee shall not be required to conduct revlews of estate or trust
investments subject to the supervision of the investment counsel, and it shall be
required to take no action in respect to those estate or trust investments unless it shall
receive written instructions from the investment counsel.
In the event investment counsel is obtained, the Trustee's fees for Its

i

'

ordinary services in respect to property subject to supervision of the investment counsel
for the period the counsel is retained, shall be reduced a reasonable amount to take
account of the absence of investment responsibility in respect to that property.

ARTICLE XXIX
NO CONTEST PROVISION

0

Trustors specifically desire that the trusts created by this document shall be
administered and distributed without litigation or dispute of any kind. If any beneficiary
of this trust, or any other person, shall seek lo establish or assert any claim to the Trust
Estate established herein, other than as provided in this document, or to attack, oppose,
or seek to set aside the administration and distribution of the Trust Estate other than as
herein set forth, then and in such event, such person or persons who shall inltlate such
action shall receive from the Trustees the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) and no more in lieu
of any interest in the Trust Estate.

[)
!.
)

ARTICLEXXX
S CORPORATION STOCK

A.
In the event any Trust created under this Trust Agreement owns stock in
one (1) or more S Corporations as defined under Section 1361 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 (or any successor Act provision), as amended or supplemented, the •
following shall apply. Such Trust shall be divided into two {2) parts, held as separate
shares. One (1) part shall consist of all assets allocated to such Trust except stock in
any S Corporations. This part shall be held and administered In accordance with the
provisions of the Article creating the Trust The balance of the assets, composed of
only S Corporation stock, shall be maintained as separate equal shares for each of the
primary beneficiaries, each of which such separate shares will constitute a QuaUfied
Subchapter S Trust for the benefit of the said primary beneficiary as provided in the
Article of this Trust Agreement creating such Trust For purposes of this Article, the
tenn primary beneficiary shall mean the individual currently entitled to receive income

0

I·

ii
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and/or principal from the Trust (but shall not include dependents of such person unless
specifically named as a beneficiary of such Trust). Except for this provision establishing
the separate Qualified Subchapter S Trust hereunder, all other provisions of the Article
.establishing such Trust shall be applicable, except to the extent that the following
specific requirements shall be applicable to such Trust. It is the Trustors 1 intention that
each such separate share holding the S Corporation stock shall constitute a Qualified
Subchapter S Trust. as defined in Internal Revenue Code Section 1361 (d)(3), as

0

amended or supplemented, and as such, the following specific requirements shall be
applicable to each of such separate shares:
1.
All Income of each such separate share shall be distributed to the
primary beneficiary who shall be the income beneficiary of such separate share.
2.
During the life of the current fncome beneficiary, th~re shall be only
one (1) income beneficiary of each such separate share.
3.
The current income beneficiary of each such separate share shall
be a citizen or resident of the United States.
4.
Any corpus distributed during the life of the current Income
beneficiary may be distributed only to such beneficiary.
5.
The income Interest of the current income beneficiary in the
separate share shall terminate on the earlier of such beneficiary's death or the
termination of the Trust.
6.
Upon the termination of the Trust during the life of the current
income beneficiary, the Trust shall distribute all of the assets held as a separate

share to such beneficiary.
B.
The provisions of this Article shall apply regardless of whether the election
to be taxed as an S Corporation was made prior or subsequent to the Trustors death.

ARTICLE XXXI
GUARDlAN'S EXPENDITURES

The Trustors do not desire, after their death, that the guardian of any minor
benefi~iary should incur personal expense in the support and maintenance of such
beneficiary. The Trustee is authorized to disburse funds from such beneficiary's Trust
Estate for the purpose of reimbursing such guardian for reasonable expenses incurred
in supporting and caring for such minor beneficiary.
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ARTICLE XXXII

I

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

A

i

Use of principal residence. On the death of the first of the Trustors, the

!

surviving Trustor shall have the right to continue to occupy and use the home, that the
surviving Truster and the deceased Trustor were using as a principal residence (if it is
part of the Trust Estate), provided, however, that the surviving Trustor, in his or her
discretion, may direct the Trustees to sell any such property and replace it with or rent
or lease another residence selected by the survivor of the Trustors of comparable or

l

l

l
I
~

lower value. The surviving Truster shall not be required to pay any rent for the use of
said residence.
B.
Simultaneous Death. If there is not sufficient evidence that the Trustors
died otherwise than simultaneously, then for purposes to this Trust Agreement it shall
be conclusively presumed for all purposes of administration and tax effect of this Trust
that the Decedent shall be the Husband and the Survivor shall be the Wife.
C.
Limitations of Trust Powers. Administration control and all other powers
relating to the various Trust Estates created hereunder, shall be exercised by the
Trustee in a fiduciary capacity and solely for the benefit of the suivivor and the Issue of

Q

the Trustors. Neither the Trustee. the Trustors, nor any other person, shall be permitted
to purchase, exchange, reacquire or otherwise deal with or dispose of the principal of
any of the various Trust Estates or the income therefrom, for less than an adequate
interest in any case or without adequate security therefor. Any person holding a
fiduciary power hereunder may release or reduce the scope of his power or may
disclaim any part or all of such power.
D.
Headings. Clause headings are not part of this Trust Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Trustors have executed this Trust Agreement
on the -44_ day of September, 2006, as Trustors and Trustees:

0
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STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this

2:)

day of

September, 2006. by Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. Smith.

n~~
Notak'Y ubttc
My commission expires:

~ngat:

.

,,

·.-:

.
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SCHEDULE "A"

KEITH L. SMITH and SHARON L. SMITH, Granters, do hereby sell, transfer,
convey, quitclaim and assign for Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable
consideration, all rights, title and interests in the property set forth below to the Grantors
as Trustees of THE SMITH FAMILY TRUST, dated t h e ~ d ay of September, 2006,
Grantee. In addition, property listed under the ownership category as KLS is the
exclusive property of THE KEITH l. SMlTH TRUST, property listed as SLS Is the
exclusive property of THE S HARON L. SMITH TRUST, and property designated KLS &
S LS is owned equally by the two Trusts.

1.

All present and future interest of the Undersigned in the following real

estate, together with all present and future improvements thereon, and all present and

Q

futu re water and water rights thereunto belonging and also including a ll prese nt and all
future personal property located 1hereon or wheresoever located:
Ownership
SLS

A.

- • Castagna Acres Subdivision, as described in the plat maps
and records on file at the County Recorder's Office, Tooele County,
State of Utah.
Tax Parcel No.:
COUNTY OF TOOELE, STATE OF UTAH

•
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2.

(°'i

The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all future

additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all new accounts and the

\_,,'

accumulations and the future additions, interest or accumulation in any and all other
financial institutions in which new accounts are opened in the future:
Ownership
KLS & SLS

Credit Union

A.

Account No. -

Prime Share
Premier Money Market
Budget Shares
Choice Plus Checking

3.

Vehicles:

Owne rship
KLS & SLS

A.

Vehicle Identification No.:
Utah Title No.:

0
KLS & SLS

4.
SLS

•

2002 Chevrolet

8.

1990 Chevrolet

All right, title and interest in and to the following:

A.

Dated the

of- I.

All interest
Smith in and to - - Family
Limited Partnersfii'p,'"'an Arizona Limited "Parmer~

Ji_ day of Septem ber, 2006.

0
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STATE OF UTAH

0

)

: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
. September, 2006, by Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. Smith.

c.It_ day of

My commission expires:

0
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